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Introduction
Why care about what emergence is, and whether there is any? To start, many complex
entities of our acquaintance—tornados, plants, people and the like—appear to be com-
posed of less complex entities, and to have features which depend, one way or another,
on features of their composing entities. Yet such complex entities also appear to be to
some extent autonomous, both ontologically and causally, from the entities upon which
they depend. Moreover, and more specifically, many “higher-level” entities (particulars,
systems, processes) treated by the special sciences appear to be broadly synchronically
dependent on “lower-level” (and ultimately fundamental physical) entities.1 Yet, as is
suggested by the associated special science laws, many higher-level entities appear also to
be ontologically and causally autonomous, in having features in virtue of which they are
distinct from and distinctively causally e cacious relative to the lower-level entities upon
which they depend, even taking into account that the latter stand in various aggregative
relations. An account of emergence making sense of these appearances would vindicate
and illuminate both our experience and the existence and tree-like structure of the spe-
cial sciences, as treating distinctively real and e cacious higher-level entities and their
features.
Reflecting these motivations, nearly all accounts of emergence take this to involve both
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1Talk of “higher-level” and “lower-level” entities is relative, and reflects the pre-theoretic and theoretic
appearances. Here I treat as at the same “level” both individual entities treated by a given science, and
certain combinations of such entities, where the allowable modes of combination include aggregations
of relations which may hold between individual entities, as well as mereological and certain boolean
combinations of such individuals or relational entities. So, for example, both atoms and relational entities
consisting of atoms standing in atomic relations are taken to be at the same level, as are mereological or
disjunctive combinations of atoms or relational atomic entities.
1
broadly synchronic dependence2 and (some measure of) ontological and causal autonomy.3
Beyond this agreement, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering vari-
ety, reflecting that the core notions of dependence and autonomy have multiple, often
incompatible interpretations.
In particular: candidate conceptions of (broadly) synchronic dependence include com-
position (Mill 1843/1973, Stephan 2002); supervenience/necessitation (Broad 1925, van
Cleve 1990, Kim 2006); causation or causal constitution (Mill 1843/1973, Searle 1992,
O’Connor and Wong 2005); and functional or other realization (Antony and Levine 1997,
Yablo 1992, Shoemaker 2001, Gillett 2002a). Candidate conceptions of ontological and
causal autonomy are even more various. Metaphysical accounts of autonomy include onto-
logical irreducibility (Silberstein and McGeever 1999, Kim 2006); novelty (Anderson 1972,
Humphreys 1996); fundamentality of properties, powers, forces, laws (the British Emer-
gentists, Cunningham 2001, O’Connor 2002, Wilson 2002); non-additivity (the British
Emergentists, Newman 1996, Bedau 1997, Silberstein and McGeever 1999); “downward”
causal e cacy (Sperry 1986, Searle 1992, Klee 1984, Schroder 1998); and multiple real-
izability (Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974, Klee 1984, Shoemaker 2001, Wimsatt 1996). And
epistemological accounts of autonomy include in-principle failure of deducibility or pre-
dictability (Broad 1925 and other British Emergentists, Klee 1984); predictability, but
only by simulation (Newman 1996, Bedau 1997); and lack of conceptual or representa-
tional entailment (Chalmers 1996, Van Gulick 2001). No surprise, then, that many recent
articles on emergence are devoted mainly to taxonomizing its many varieties (Klee 1984,
Van Gulick 2001, Stephan 2002).
Though in general a thousand flowers may fruitfully bloom, this much diversity is
unuseful for purposes of illuminating the structure of natural reality. Di↵erent accounts
often disagree on whether an entity is emergent; and when they agree, there is often
no clear basis for this agreement. Hence it is said that references to emergence “seem
2Some take emergence to be diachronic, but for present purposes, this seeming distinction can be
glossed. Mill (1843/1973) suggests that certain (“heteropathic”) e↵ects emerge from temporally prior
causes, but also suggests that the features having powers to produce such e↵ects synchronically emerge
from lower-level entities (see §3.3.1). O’Connor and Wong (2005) take emergence to be diachronic on
grounds that emergent features are caused by lower-level features, and causation is diachronic; but the
essentials of their account are preserved if (the relevant) causation is synchronic (see §2.3). And Rueger
(2001)) takes emergence to be diachronic since involving temporally extended processes; but the emer-
gence of such processes is compatible with these “synchronically” depending on a temporally extended
base (compare spatiotemporally global supervenience). Humphreys (1997) characterizes an irreducibly
diachronic emergence, involving the exhaustive (non-mereological) “fusion” of lower-level entities into
another lower-level entity; but such emergence is besides the point of accommodating the existence of
higher-level entities, and so will be set aside here.
3These core components are occasionally explicitly flagged (see Bedau 1997), but more typically are
encoded in specific accounts of dependence and autonomy, as when Kim (2006, p. 548) says “two [. . . ] nec-
essary components of any concept of emergence that is true to its historical origins [. . . ] are supervenience
and irreducibility”. Here and throughout I distinguish ontological autonomy (distinctness) from causal
autonomy (distinctive causal e cacy), and I assume that both are required of an account of metaphysical
emergence aiming to vindicate special science entities as entering into distinctive (typically causal) laws;
this assumption also reflects that causal as well as ontological autonomy is constitutive of the distinctively
emergentist responses to the problem of higher-level causation that we will later consider. Of course,
causal autonomy entails ontological autonomy, by Leibniz’s law. Ontological autonomy is compatible with
an absence of causal autonomy, however, as with epiphenomenalist accounts of higher-level entities; corre-
spondingly, though epiphenomenalist accounts are occasionally presented as accounts of “emergence” (see
Chalmers 2006), they are not so in the sense at issue here.
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to have no settled meaning” (Byrne 1994, p. 206), that accounts of emergence are “not
obviously reconcilable with one another” (O’Connor 1994, p. 91), and that “those dis-
cussing emergence, even face to face, more often than not talk past each other” (Kim
2006, p. 548). Moreover, and importantly for the relevance of emergence to contempo-
rary debate, di↵erent accounts often disagree over whether emergence is compatible with
Physicalism, according to which all broadly scientific entities are “nothing over and above”
physical entities. So, to take just one example, Kim 1999 takes physical realization to be
incompatible with emergence, while Gillett 2002b takes such realization to be required.
I’ll argue here that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I’ll start by show-
ing, by attention to the available responses to the problem of higher-level causation, that
there are two and only two schematic conceptions of higher-level metaphysical emergence
of broadly scientific entities: Strong and Weak emergence, respectively (§1). The two
schemas are similar in each imposing a condition on the powers of entities taken to be
emergent, relative to the powers of their base entities. For purposes of appreciating the
generality of the schemas, it is of the first importance to register that the notion of “power”
here is metaphysically almost entirely neutral, reflecting commitment just to the plausible
thesis that what causes an entity may potentially bring about (perhaps only contingently)
are associated with how the entity is—that is, with its features.4 As I’ll discuss, even a
categoricalist contingentist Humean could accept powers in the weak sense at issue in the
schemas. Though similar in each involving a condition on powers, the schemas are also
crucially di↵erent—a di↵erence reflected in the fact that (given the physical acceptability
of the lower-level entities) one schema is compatible with Physicalism and the other is
not. (The results here generalize to distinguish two basic forms of higher-level emergence
from lower-level entities, whether or not the latter are physically acceptable.) I will then
consider the main accounts of emergent dependence (§2) and emergent autonomy (§3 and
§4), and argue that all such accounts intended as characterizing metaphysical emergence
are appropriately interpreted as targeting one or the other schema. The two schemas
thus unify and clarify the many apparently diverse accounts of higher-level metaphysi-
cal emergence, while explaining controversy over whether emergence is compatible with
Physicalism.
Others have observed that accounts of emergence may be broadly sorted into “weak”
and “strong” varieties, that are and are not compatible with Physicalism, respectively; see,
for example, Smart 1981, Bedau 1997, Chalmers 2006, and Clayton 2006. My treatment
goes beyond these (typically gestural) treatments in explicitly cashing the distinction
between Weak and Strong emergence in metaphysical rather than epistemological terms,
in more specifically identifying the di↵ering schematic metaphysical bases for these two
types of emergence, and in explicitly locating the schemas in a representative spectrum
of existing accounts of emergent dependence and emergent autonomy. My treatment
also goes beyond previous taxonomic descriptions of the varieties of emergence, in that
the schemas for Weak and Strong emergence exhaust the available ways in which higher-
level, broadly scientific entities might synchronically emerge from lower-level such entities,
and—along a critical dimension—to show that certain accounts have more work to do
if they are to ensure satisfaction of the condition on (metaphysically neutral) powers
requisite to the intended schema.
4Here and elsewhere, nominalists are invited to interpret talk of features (properties, states) in their
preferred terms
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1 Two schemas for emergence
1.1 The target cases
Accounts of emergence tend to focus on emergence of features (e.g., either tokens or types
of properties or states) from lower-level features, it being supposed (as per the background
contrast with substance dualism; see §2.1) that emergence of entities (systems, processes,
particulars) may be understood in terms of emergent features.5 The lower-level features
are typically taken to be physically acceptable relational features—that is, physically
acceptable features of relational lower-level (and ultimately physical) entities.6 So, for
example, a discussion of emergence might target the seeming autonomous dependence of
. . .
⇠ . . . the higher-level property/state (of a complex system) of being in the basin of
a strange attractor, on the (lower-level, relational) property/state (of a system of
molecules) of having parts with certain positions and momenta.
⇠ . . . the property/state (of a plant) of being phototropic on the (lower-level, rela-
tional) property (of the plant’s cellular walls) of being such as to undergo certain
cellular wall weakenings and cellular expansions.
⇠ . . . a mental property/state (of a person) on a (lower-level, relational) neurophysio-
logical property/state (of certain neurons standing in certain neuronal relations).
Emergence, as applying to such cases, is treated (multiple dependence or realizabil-
ity to one side) as a one-one relation between higher-level and lower-level features. This
treatment presupposes that certain relational lower-level entities exist and have features
serving as a dependence base for the associated emergent features. The presupposition is
useful, in encoding (as had by the posited lower-level relational entity) the sorts of features
of complex entities that are assumed by all parties not to be emergent, in any interest-
ing sense. Alternatively, one might dispense with the relational lower-level middleman
and take the dependence base to consist in collections of comparatively non-relational
lower-level features (say, features of individual molecules and pairwise relations between
individual molecules), understood as combinable via certain ontologically “lightweight”
compositional principles, including additive causal combination (see §3.3), and certain
boolean or mereological operations (see fn. 1 and §3.5). In any case, it’s clear that the
“one-one” and “many-one” approaches target the same phenomena: the latter consid-
ers the nature of the dependence of a higher-level entity on comparatively non-relational
lower-level entities given certain allowable combinatorial principles, whereas the former
considers the nature of the dependence of a higher-level entity on relational lower-level
entities having features allowed by the combinatorial principles. By default I’ll take the
one-one perspective, but as we’ll see some accounts of emergent dependence and autonomy
take the many-one perspective.
5Hence Bedau (2002, p. 6) says: “[A]n entity with an emergent property is an emergent entity and an
emergent phenomenon involves an emergent entity possessing an emergent property—and they all can be
traced back to the notion of an emergent property.”
6“Physically acceptable” here refers to entities and features that are (taken to be, in some or other
sense) “nothing over and above” physical entities and features, where physical entities and features are,
roughly and commonly, the relatively non-complex, not-fundamentally-mental entities and features that
are the proper subject matter of fundamental physics (see Wilson 2006).
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1.2 The problem of higher-level causation
The primary challenge to the supposition that higher-level entities may be dependent on
yet ontologically and causally autonomous from lower-level entities is posed by the problem
of higher-level causation, which gets started with the question: how can special science
entities cause e↵ects, given their strong synchronic dependence on lower-level (ultimately
physical) entities?
First, some setup. I assume that the e cacy of entities lies in their having e cacious
features; talk of entities themselves is thus suppressed. Moreover, given that causation
is in the first instance a relation between spatiotemporally located goings-on, reference
to features in what follows is to be understood as reference to spatiotemporally located
tokens (e.g., property instances, states, events) potentially of a type (property, state type,
event type).7
Four of the premises leading to the problem concern special science features:
1. Special science features depend on lower-level physically acceptable relational fea-
tures (henceforth, “base features”) in that, at a minimum, special science features
(at least nomologically) require and are (at least nomologically) necessitated by base
features.
2. Both special science features and their base features are real.
3. Special science features are causally e cacious.
4. Special science features are distinct from their base features.
And two concern causation:
5. Every lower-level physically acceptable e↵ect has a purely lower-level physically
acceptable cause.
6. In general (apart from “firing squad” cases), e↵ects are not causally overdetermined.8
There are two cases to consider, in each of which a special science feature S depends,
on a given occasion, on base feature P (1). First, suppose that S causes special science
feature S* on a given occasion (compatible with 3). S* is dependent on some base feature
P* (1), such that P* necessitates S*, with at least nomological necessity. Moreover, P*
has a purely lower-level physically acceptable cause (5)—plausibly, and without loss of
generality, P . If P causes P*, and P* (at least nomologically) necessitates S*, then it is
plausible that P causes S*, by causing P*. So, it appears, both P and S cause S*, and
given that P and S are both real and distinct (2, 4), S* is causally overdetermined in a
way (given 1) not appropriately understood in ‘firing squad’ terms, contra (6).
Second, suppose that S causes some base feature P* (compatible with 3). P*, being
a lower-level physically acceptable feature, has a purely physically acceptable cause (by
5)—plausibly, and without loss of generality, P . So, it appears, both P and S cause
7That said, I will sometimes gloss the type/token distinction—e.g., when discussing necessitation of
features (involving instances of the type at issue), below.
8The qualifier ‘in general’ reflects that e↵ects may sometimes be causally overdetermined, as in so-called
‘firing squad’ cases.
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P*, and given that P and S are both real and distinct (by 2 and 4), P* is causally
overdetermined, again (by 1) in non-firing squad fashion, contra (6).
So goes the argument that real, distinct and e cacious higher-level features induce
problematic overdetermination. Responses to the (valid) argument involve rejecting one
of the six premises. The first four are as follows:
⇠ Substance dualism or Pan/proto-psychism. Deny (1): avoid overdetermination by
denying that S depends on physically acceptable P .
⇠ Eliminativism. Deny (2): avoid overdetermination by denying that S and/or S* is
real.
⇠ Epiphenomenalism. Deny (3): avoid overdetermination by denying that S is e ca-
cious.
⇠ Reductive physicalism. Deny (4): avoid overdetermination by denying that S is
distinct from P .
None of these strategies makes sense of the seeming emergence of higher-level features:
Substance dualism and Pan/proto-psychism fail to accommodate dependence; Elimina-
tivism and Reductive physicalism fail to accommodate ontological autonomy; Epiphenom-
enalism and, some think, Reductive physicalism, fail to accommodate causal autonomy.
1.3 The two “emergentist” strategies
The remaining strategies do better by way of accommodating emergence. These are:
⇠ Robust emergentism. Deny (5): avoid overdetermination by denying that every
lower-level physically acceptable e↵ect has a purely lower-level physically acceptable
cause.
⇠ Non-reductive physicalism. Deny (6): allow that there is overdetermination, but
deny that it is of the “firing squad” variety that would be intuitively problematic
as generally characterizing higher-level causation.
I’ll now argue, for each of these strategies, that the strategy may be perspicuously un-
derstood as imposing one or another condition on the causal powers (henceforth, just
‘powers’) of a given special science feature, and that satisfaction of the associated condi-
tion provides a plausible principled basis for taking the feature to be emergent, in ways
that proponents of each strategy would endorse.
1.3.1 A metaphysically neutral understanding of powers
Before getting started, let us ask: What are powers? Here, talk of “powers” is simply
shorthand for talk of what causal contributions possession of a given feature makes (or
can make, relative to the same laws of nature) to an entity’s bringing about an e↵ect,
when in certain circumstances. That features are associated with actual or potential
causal contributions (“powers”) reflects the uncontroversial fact that what entities do
(can do, relative to the same laws of nature) depends on how they are (what features they
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have). So, for example, a magnet attracts nearby pins in virtue of being magnetic, not
massy; a magnet falls to the ground when dropped in virtue of being massy, not magnetic.
Moreover, a feature may contribute to diverse e↵ects, given diverse circumstances of its
occurrence (which circumstances may be internal or external to the entity possessing the
feature). Anyone accepting that what e↵ects a particular causes (can cause, relative to
the same laws of nature) is in part a function of what features it has—e↵ectively, all
participants to the present debate—is in position to accept “powers”, in this shorthand,
metaphysically neutral and nomologically motivated sense.9
Besides commitment to the platitude that what entities can do (cause), relative to
the same laws of nature, depends on how they are (what features they have), only one
metaphysical condition is required in order to make sense of the powers-based conditions
to follow; namely, that one’s account of (actual or potential) causal contributions (powers)
has resources su cient to ground the identity (or non-identity) of a token causal contri-
bution associated with a token of a higher-level feature, with a token causal contribution
associated with a token of a lower-level feature. Here again, e↵ectively all participants
to the debate can make sense of such identity (non-identity) claims as applied to token
(actual or potential) causal contributions (token “powers”).10
Of course, beyond the neutral characterization of powers, understood as tracking the
nomologically determined causal contributions associated with a given feature, philoso-
phers disagree. It is of the first importance, in order to appreciate the generality of the
upcoming schemas for emergence, to see that no commitment to any controversial theses
about powers (or associated notions such as property or law) will be required payment in
what follows. Three key points of non-commitment, to be further discussed and defended
in S 1.3.3., are worth highlighting.
First, nothing in what follows requires accepting that it is essential to features that
they have the powers they actually have. Maybe powers are essential to features; maybe
they aren’t. As we will shortly see, it su ces to characterize the robust emergentist and
non-reductive physicalist strategies, and associated schemas for emergence, that powers
are contingently had by the features at issue.
Second, nothing in what follows requires accepting that features are exhaustively in-
9For example, even a contingentist categoricalist Humean can accept powers in the neutral sense here:
for such a Humean, to say that a (ultimately categorical) feature has a certain “power” would be to say
that, were a token of the feature to occur in certain circumstances, a certain (contingent) regularity would
be instanced. Of course, contemporary Humeans will implement more sophisticated variations on this
theme.
10For example, suppose a contingentist categoricalist Humean wants to take a non-reductive physicalist
approach to the problem of higher-level causation, and so aims (as I will expand on below) to identify
every token power of a token higher-level feature with a token power of its lower-level base feature. As
previously, such a Humean understands “powers” in terms of actual or potential instances of a (contingent)
regularity. Where the aim is to avoid overdetermination, the Humean may suppose, to start, that the
(relevant instances of the) regularities overlap, both with respect to the (single) e↵ect, and with respect to
the (single) circumstances in which the two token features occur. If the Humean is moreover a reductive
physicalist, they may suppose that such overlap motivates identifying the token features at issue, and hence
the associated powers. If the Humean is a non-reductive physicalist, they can reject this identification of
features, on “di↵erence-making” grounds (e.g., of the sort associated with Mill’s methods). Such a Humean
will suppose that attention to broader patterns of regularities can provide a basis for identifying token
powers of token features, even when the token features are not themselves identical. Whether reductive
or non-reductive, the contingentist categoricalist Humean can make sense of the claim that some, all, or
none of the token powers of token features are identical. This case is like the case of New York: if we can
make it (out) here, we can make it (out) anywhere.
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dividuated by powers. Maybe they are; maybe they aren’t: perhaps features are also or
ultimately individuated by quiddities or other non-causal aspects of features. In any case,
the presence or absence of quiddities, which primarily serve to locate actually instanced
features in worlds with di↵erent laws of nature, plays no role in actually individuating
broadly scientific features in either scientific law or practice. As such, the presence or
absence of non-causal aspects of the features at issue can play no interesting role in a
metaphysical account aiming to vindicate the scientific appearances supporting higher-
level emergence; and nor does it, in the schemas to come.
Third, nothing in what follows requires accepting that powers are or are not reducible
to categorical features, or that attributions of powers are or are not reducible to certain
conditionals or counterfactuals, etc. Maybe powers, or talk of them, are reducible to
other entities or terms; maybe they aren’t. Again, scientific theorizing and practice is
transparent to such further metaphysical details, and so too should be—and are—our
associated conceptions of emergence.
1.3.2 Robust emergentism
As above, the robust emergentist maintains that some special science features are real,
distinct, and distinctively causally e cacious as compared to their (lower-level, physically
acceptable) base features. Overdetermination is avoided by denying, contra all varieties
of Physicalism, that every lower-level physically acceptable e↵ect has a purely lower-level
physically acceptable cause.
In terms of powers: the robust emergentist maintains either (a) that P does not have
the power to cause E, or more plausibly, (b) that while P does have the power to cause E,
this power is not identical with that had by S—it is manifested di↵erently, or in di↵erent
conditions (perhaps, e.g., P causes S, and S then more directly causes E). Implementing
either (a) or (b) requires that the powers of the higher-level feature satisfy the following
condition:
New powers condition: Token higher-level feature S has, on the occasion in
question, at least one token power not numerically identical with any token
power of the token lower-level feature P on which S synchronically depends,
on that occasion.
It is clear that satisfaction of this condition guarantees that S is both ontologically
and causally autonomous from P : since S has a token power that P doesn’t have, S is
distinct from P (by Leibniz’s law) and can do at least one thing that P can’t do, or in
any case cannot do in the same way as S.
1.3.3 Non-reductive physicalism
Like the robust emergentist, the non-reductive physicalist maintains that (some) special
science features are real, distinct, and distinctively causally e cacious with respect to their
base features. Problematic overdetermination is avoided by taking higher-level and base
features to stand in a relation that, while not identity, is intimate enough to avoid overde-
termination of the “firing squad” variety. In presenting their strategy, non-reductive phys-
icalists typically endorse some or other “realization” relation as holding between tokens or
types of the features at issue, which plausibly avoids problematic overdetermination; these
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include functional realization, the part/whole relation, and the determinable/determinate
relation. This seeming diversity hides a deeper unity of strategy, however, which again
can be put in terms of a certain condition on powers (see Wilson 1999 and forthcoming).
To start, the non-reductive physicalist maintains, as does the reductive physicalist,
that every token power of S is identical to a token power of P . They moreover maintain
that the token powers of S are a proper subset of the token powers of P , as per:
Subset condition on powers : Token higher-level feature S has, on the occasion
in question, a non-empty proper subset of the token powers of the token lower-
level feature P on which S synchronically depends, on that occasion.
Satisfaction of the condition clearly blocks problematic overdetermination: when a
power of S manifests in a given e↵ect on a given occasion, there is only one causing (as
between S and P ), not two.
Satisfaction of this condition also guarantees conformity to Physicalism, compatible
with both ontological and causal autonomy.
Let’s start with conformity to Physicalism. To start, note that the recipe for avoiding
overdetermination accommodates the core physicalist claim (premise 5, above) that every
lower-level physically acceptable e↵ect has a purely lower-level physically acceptable cause.
Moreover, imposition of the condition blocks all the usual routes to physical unac-
ceptability. The main concern about physical acceptability turns on the possibility that
a realized entity might be robustly emergent, such that, as above, either (a) S does not
have the power to cause the e↵ect E in question, or (b) that while P does have the power
to cause this e↵ect, this power is not identical with that had by S (it is manifested dif-
ferently, or in di↵erent conditions). Satisfaction of the subset condition blocks both (a)
and (b). Satisfaction of the condition also blocks the other live routes to physical unac-
ceptability, associated with S’s being non-natural (see Moore 1903) or supernatural: such
designations plausibly require the having of non-natural or supernatural powers, which
are ruled out by satisfaction of the subset condition (assuming, as we are, that the base
feature P has no such powers).
Now, as it stands (and remaining broadly neutral on the metaphysics of features) sat-
isfaction of the proper subset condition is compatible with S’s having a non-causal aspect
not had by P—say, a non-causal quiddity or an epiphenomenal quale. But, as discussed
above, and as is reflected in the dispute between robust emergentists and physicalists, any
non-causal aspects of S are irrelevant to broadly scientific goings-on: scientific truths do
not in any way depend on or otherwise track whether scientific features have non-causal
aspects (much less track how any such aspects are related). Hence that S has such as-
pects (whether or not shared by P ) cannot undermine S’s physical acceptability, given
P ’s physical acceptability.
This point bears emphasizing, since many have supposed—following the usual sup-
positions of advocates of non-reductive realization as involving a proper subset condition
on powers (e.g., Shoemaker 2001 and Clapp 2001)—that such an account of realization
requires commitment to an account of features on which these are essentially or exhaus-
tively individuated by their powers. Hence Melnyk (2006, pp. 141–143) suggests that
unless features are identified with clusters of token powers, satisfaction of the proper sub-
set condition will not guarantee conformity to Physicalism, since such satisfaction will
not guarantee that physically realized entities are constituted by physical entities, or that
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truths about physically realized entities are made true by physical goings-on. More specif-
ically, Melnyk claims that if realized features have non-causal aspects, then even though
an entity’s having P entails that it has (bestowed upon it) the token powers associated
with having S, it won’t follow from satisfaction of the proper subset condition that the
entity’s having P constitutes its having S, or that the entity’s having P (along with phys-
ical laws, etc.) makes S truly attributed to it. But this is incorrect: truths about physical
constitution or truthmaking, being broadly scientific truths, are neutral as regards what-
ever non-causal aspects of features there might be; hence the grounds of such truths must
also be neutral on whether properties have non-causal aspects. It follows that satisfaction
of the proper subset condition su ces for conformity with Physicalism independent of
whether states or features are exhaustively individuated by their associated powers.11
The general pattern, blocking any route to S’s physical unacceptability, is as follows:
if P is physically acceptable, and every power of S is identical with a power of P , then
any causal aspects of S are guaranteed to be physically acceptable; non-causal aspects of
S are irrelevant to M ’s physical acceptability; hence a realization relation satisfying the
proper subset condition on powers guarantees S’s physical acceptability, in conformity to
Physicalism, independent of what account of properties one endorses.
Let’s turn now to the question of autonomy. Satisfaction of the subset condition clearly
accommodates ontological autonomy: if S has only a proper subset of P ’s powers, then S
is distinct from P , by Leibniz’s law. The strategy arguably also makes room for S’s being
causally autonomous, with the key idea being that causal autonomy does not require that
S have a distinctive power. Rather, it is enough that S have a distinctive set (collection,
plurality) of powers—that is, a distinctive power profile.
How might the having of a distinctive power profile su ce for causal autonomy? One
case for this appeals to di↵erence-making or other “proportionality” considerations, in
cases where S (or S’s type) is multiply realizable. Suppose S is a state of feeling thirsty,
which causes an e↵ect E—say, a reaching for a glass of water. Now suppose that S (or
another instance of S’s type, etc.) had been realized by P 0 rather than P . Would the (or
a) reaching still have occurred? Intuitively, yes, because the “extra” powers possessed by
P , in virtue of which it di↵ers from P 0—say, to produce a specific reading on a neuronal
state detector—don’t matter for the production of the (or a) reaching. Rather, all that
matters for this are the powers associated with S. That S’s distinctive power profile
contains just the powers crucial for E provides a principled reason for taking S to be
causally e cacious vis-a´-vis E in a way that is distinctive from P ’s e cacy vis-a´-vis E.12
Another case for taking distinctive power profiles to (at least sometimes) su ce for
causal autonomy appeals to the connection between sets of powers and distinctive systems
11Similarly for Melnyk’s other claim (138–140) that unless realized entities are identified with clusters
of powers, the condition’s satisfaction will not guarantee satisfaction of the “necessitation” condition,
according to which a physically acceptable realized entity must (perhaps together with physical laws, etc.)
metaphysically necessitate the realized entity: “Why should it? Why assume that along with possession
of power-tokens of certain types there automatically comes possession of a property [. . . ] that would have
conferred them?” ( 140). Given that truths about broadly scientific entities are transparent to facts about
non-causal aspects of entities, from an entity’s possession of power-tokens of a type it does “automatically”
follow that the entity has the feature, whether or not features have non-causal aspects.
12Note that nothing in this line of thought requires that one accept a “di↵erence-making” account of
causation or relatedly, that one reject P as being a cause of E. The suggestion is simply that attention
to di↵erence-making considerations provides a principled ground for S’s being distinctively e cacious as
compared to P .
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of laws (e.g., the special science laws governing entities of S’s type). Plausibly, systems
of laws track causal joints in nature. Correspondingly, S’s distinctive power profile is
indicative of a distinctive causal joint in nature. Causal joints may overlap—in particular,
in respect of S’s and P ’s power to cause e↵ect E. Still, if the joints as a whole are di↵erent,
this provides a principled basis for taking S to be distinctively e cacious vis-a´-vis E, in
that S produces E as part of a di↵erent system of laws than P .13
1.4 Strong and Weak emergence
The robust emergentist and non-reductive physicalist responses to the problem of higher-
level causation are the only responses aiming to accommodate the metaphysical emergence—
dependence with ontological and causal autonomy—of higher-level entities; and as just
argued, there are cases to be made that satisfaction of either of the associated conditions
on powers would fulfill this aim. Moreover, and independent of the specifics of the problem
(in particular, independent of the shared assumption that the base entities are physically
acceptable), attention to these conditions makes clear the relatively limited ways in which,
most crucially, the causal (hence also ontological) autonomy of a higher-level feature vis-
a´-vis its base feature may be gained. To wit: the feature may (as per robust emergentism)
have more powers than its base feature; or the feature may (as per non-reductive phys-
icalism) have fewer powers that its base feature. Since complete coincidence of powers
doesn’t make room for causal autonomy, these routes to emergence exhaust the options.
We may thus take the responses as exhaustive representative bases for two schematic
conceptions of metaphysical emergence. The first schema is that associated with robust
emergentism:
Strong emergence: Token higher-level feature S is strongly emergent from
token lower-level feature P just in case (i) S synchronically depends on P ,
and (ii) S has at least one token power not identical with any token power of
P .
(For simplicity, in presenting the schemas I suppress reference to occasions.) The first
condition minimally specifies synchronic dependence; the second (e↵ectively, New powers
condition, above) captures the comparatively strong sense in which an emergent feature
is causally, hence ontologically, autonomous vis-a´-vis its base feature.
The second schema is that associated with non-reductive physicalism:
Weak emergence: Token higher-level feature S is weakly emergent from token
lower-level feature P just in case (i) S synchronically depends on P , and (ii)
S has a proper subset of the token powers had by P .
Again, the first condition minimally specifies synchronic dependence; the second (e↵ec-
tively, Subset condition on powers) captures the comparatively weak sense in which an
emergent entity is causally, hence ontologically, autonomous of its base entity.
Each schema encodes a di↵erent way in which a higher-level feature might be de-
pendent on, yet ontologically and causally autonomous from, a base feature; and thus
is promising, so far as accommodating the motivations for emergence is concerned. And
13See Wilson in progress for a fuller defense of this claim.
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again, attention to the available responses to the problem of higher-level causation, and
the associated relations between powers that might serve as a basis for dependent causal
autonomy, indicate that these schemas encode the only options for characterizing the
metaphysical emergence of higher-level, broadly scientific entities (henceforth, typically,
just ‘emergence’).
Let’s now turn to seeing how specific accounts of emergent dependence and emer-
gent autonomy, properly disambiguated and interpreted, aim to conform to one or other
schema. In what follows, I’ll usually leave o↵ the qualifier “aim to”, since my primary goal
is not to assess the success of these accounts for purposes of characterizing emergence, but
to make explicit their underlying theoretical intentions for doing so. That said, as prefig-
ured, my discussion will track certain concerns about whether a given account presently
satisfies its aim. One final remark before getting started: reflecting the role of emergence
in the physicalism debates, accounts of emergent dependence and autonomy frequently
presuppose that the base entities at issue are physically acceptable; the morals to be
drawn, however, are broadly independent of this presupposition.
2 Emergent dependence
Four accounts of emergent dependence are on o↵er: material composition, modal covaria-
tion, causation or causal dependence, and functional or other realization. The first two are
not exclusive of the last two: e↵ectively all accounts of higher-level emergence take both
material composition and modal covariation to be some part of emergent dependence.
Where accounts primarily di↵er, as we will see, is in the assumed strength of modal
covariation, and (relatedly) in whether broadly causal or rather realization-based depen-
dence is (tacitly or explicitly) assumed. As I’ll argue, accounts of emergent dependence
di↵ering in these respects conform to either Strong or Weak emergence, respectively.
2.1 Material composition
Accounts of emergence typically suppose that special science entities (systems, processes,
particulars) depend on lower-level, ultimately physical entities at least in that the former
are exhaustively composed of the latter:
All organised [living] bodies are composed of parts similar to those composing
inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic
state; but the phenomena of life which result from the juxtaposition of those
parts in a certain manner bear no analogy to any of the e↵ects which would
be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere
physical agents. (Mill 1843/1973, p. 243)
The first feature of contemporary theories of emergence, the thesis of physical
monism, is a thesis about the nature of systems that have emergent properties
(or structures). The thesis says that the bearers of emergent properties are
made up of material parts only. It denies that there are any supernatural
components responsible for a systems having emergent properties. Thus, all
substance-dualistic positions are rejected [. . . ]. (Stephan 2002, p. 79)
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Indeed, the assumption of compositional dependence reflects the intended contrast
with dualist accounts on which higher-level features depend on the existence of physically
unacceptable entities (e.g., souls, entelechies, conscious or proto-conscious fundamental
particles). Compositional dependence is, however, compatible with either Weak or Strong
emergence, and indeed, with the absence of emergence, since it is a further question,
concerning any exhaustively physically composed particular, what features it has and
whether any of these are emergent in either schematic sense.
2.2 Modal covariation
A further common baseline assumption is that emergent features depend on base features
in standing in certain relations of (at least nomologically) necessary covariation, reflecting
that emergent features both require (for their occurrence) and are upwardly necessitated
by base features. So, for example, Broad (1925) maintains that emergent features of a
compound are functionally dependent on features of the compound’s parts (54-5), and
that emergent features are “completely determined” by such lower-level features, in that
“whenever you have a whole composed of these [. . . ] elements in certain proportions and
relations you have something with the [compound’s] characteristic properties” (64); van
Cleve (1990) concurs that “an emergent property of w is one that depends on and is
determined by the properties of the parts of w” (222). The holding of both directions of
necessary correlation may be expressed by (a version of) supervenience (see Kim 1990)
that I’ll call “minimally nomological supervenience”, according to which an emergent
feature (at least nomologically) requires some base feature, and a given base feature (at
least nomologically) necessitates any associated emergent feature.14
Understood as an asymmetric relation (see Kim 1998, 11), minimally nomological
supervenience distinguishes reductive from emergent dependence. Without further speci-
fication, however, such a conception is compatible with either Strong or Weak emergence.
Broad and other robust emergentists typically maintain that emergent features minimally
nomologically supervene on base features. And the schema for Strong emergence makes
sense of such claims: laws of nature, after all, express what broadly scientific entities
can do—that is, what powers they have; hence if an emergent feature has a power not
had by its base feature per (as Strong emergence), it is plausible to suppose that the
features stand in some sort of nomological connection (see §2.3). Minimally nomologi-
cal supervenience is also compatible with Weak emergence, for some relations satisfying
Weak emergence (e.g., the determinable/determinate relation) entail that the higher-level
entities supervene with metaphysical, hence with nomological, necessity (see §2.4).
It remains to consider whether strengthening of the modal covariation relations—
pertaining specifically to the strength of upward necessitation—distinguishes Strong from
Weak emergence. Indeed, many accept as characteristic of physically unacceptable emer-
gence that emergent features would supervene with only nomological necessity on base
entities, in contrast with relations (like identity or the determinable-determinate relation)
which plausibly preserve physical acceptability. So, for example, Chalmers (2006) says,
[C]onsciousness still supervenes on the physical domain. But importantly, this
14The notion of upward necessitation may be stochastic (see Kim 2006, p. 550); emergent dependence
need not be deterministic.
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supervenience holds only with the strength of laws of nature (in the philosoph-
ical jargon, it is natural or nomological supervenience). (p. X)
Van Cleve (1990) similarly characterizes emergence of the sort intended to contrast with
Physicalism:
If P is a property of w, then P is emergent i↵ P supervenes with nomological
necessity, but not with logical necessity, on the properties of the parts of w.
(p. 222)
Though common, the supposition that Strong and Weak emergence contrast with re-
spect to modal strength of dependence relation is problematic, for two reasons. First, a
physically acceptable feature might supervene with only nomological necessity on a physi-
cally acceptable base feature. For example, the subset condition inWeak emergence could
be satisfied even if features are essentially individuated by non-causal quiddities and only
contingently associated with their actual powers. Second, a physically unacceptable fea-
ture might supervene with metaphysical necessity on a physically acceptable base feature
(see Wilson 2005). This would be the case if, for example, a consistent Malbranchean
God brought about certain higher-level features upon the occasion of certain lower-level
features in every possible world; or if features are essentially constituted by (all) the laws
of nature into which they directly or indirectly enter; or if some robustly emergent fea-
tures are grounded in non-physical interactions, and all the fundamental interactions are
unified.
These considerations lead to a dilemma for anyone aiming to distinguish physically
acceptable from unacceptable emergence by appeal to modal correlations alone. Those
characterizing robust emergence in terms of mere nomological supervenience sometimes
reject counter-cases whereby Strong emergent features supervene with metaphysical ne-
cessity on base properties, as violating Hume’s Dictum, according to which there are no
metaphysically necessary connections between (wholly) distinct entities. As it happens,
Strong emergent features need not be wholly distinct from base features (see Stoljar 2007),
and in any case post-Humean reasons for believing Hume’s Dictum are in short supply
(see Wilson 2010b). But suppose that Hume’s Dictum is accepted, and grant that it en-
sures that Stong emergent dependence holds with only nomological necessity. It remains,
as per the first counter-case, that physically acceptable features might supervene on base
features with only nomological necessity—if, as above, features are essentially individu-
ated by non-causal quiddities, not powers. To block this case, non-causal quiddities must
be rejected as individuated of powers. But—here’s the dilemma—proponents of Hume’s
Dictum arguably must (and typically do) accept non-causal quiddities as essentially in-
dividuating features, since after all (as per their denial that there are no metaphysically
necessary causal connections) they cannot take features to be essentially individuated by
powers. The means of blocking the two counter-cases are thus incompatible with each
other, in which case a modal characterization of the distinction between physically accept-
able and unacceptable emergence cannot be maintained, even if one is willing to commit
to certain controversial metaphysical theses.
Moving forward, it’s worth noting that, though covariation accounts o cially aim to
characterize emergent dependence in purely correlation terms, they rely for their plausibil-
ity on the underlying contrast between certain nomological relations (e.g., causation) and
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certain metaphysical relations (e.g., the determinable/determinate relation). The next
two proposals each cash out emergent dependence by explicit appeal to such relations, so
as to both plausibly and determinately target either Strong or Weak emergence.
2.3 Causation or causal dependence
Yablo (1992) notes “a subtle interpretive question about supervenience”, according to
which
On the emergence interpretation, a thing’s physical properties are metaphys-
ically prior to its mental properties and bring them into being. To caricature
emergentism just slightly, supervenience is a kind of “supercausation” which
improves on the original in that supercauses act immediately and metaphysi-
cally guarantee their supere↵ects [. . . ]. (pp. 256-7)
The suggestion that emergent dependence is in some sense causal rages back to Mill Mill
(1843/1973), the father of British Emergentism. Here it is important to be clear con-
cerning how emergent features are considered causally dependent on base features. Mill’s
discussion initially focuses on a distinction between “homopathic” and “heteropathic” ef-
fects of a composite entity, where the former but not the latter e↵ects are broadly additive
combinations of e↵ects of the sort that would have been produced were the component
entities acting separately. Such a conception of emergence aims ultimately to characterize
emergent autonomy in terms of a failure of additivity of causal influences, where such
failure, in turn, is criterial of the composite entity’s having a new power (to produce the
heteropathic e↵ect); see McLaughlin 1992. Hence it is ultimately not (heteropathic) ef-
fects, but rather features of complex entities having powers to produce such e↵ects, which
are emergent by Mill’s lights. (See §3.3.1.)
That said, the question remains whether emergence of such features might itself be
a causal phenomenon. Indeed, there are two ways in which emergent features might
be causally dependent on base features. First, base features might act as a synchronic
nomologically necessary precondition for the operation, or coming into play, of certain
nomological features—i.e., fundamental forces or interactions—associated in turn with
new powers; even if the relation here is not causation as traditionally understood, it
nonetheless involves broadly causal lawful dependence (see Wilson 2002). This is the
sort of causal dependence that is generally operative in British Emergentist accounts.
Second, base features might more straightforwardly cause emergent features, as some
contemporary emergentists (O’Connor 1994, O’Connor and Wong 2005) suppose. The
two approaches (causal dependence vs. causation) are close variants, with the primary
di↵erence being that, if one supposes that causation is diachronic, one might further
suppose that emergence is diachronic (as do O’Connor and Wong); but the diachronicity
of causation is controversial, and nothing important hangs on this issue.
In particular, independent of whether emergent dependence is synchronic or diachronic,
a conception in terms of causation or causal dependence will make good sense of Strong
emergence. Either way an emergent feature has powers di↵erent from its base features: if
caused, because e↵ects typically have powers di↵erent from those of their causes; if causally
dependent, because the operation of new fundamental forces or interactions serves as a
(perhaps partial) ground for the having of new powers. The precise nature of the ground
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for the new powers varies depending on the preferred account of causal autonomy (see
§1.2, §1.3, and §1.4).
Seeing how causation and causal dependence make sense of Strong emergence sheds
light on Kim’s (2006, p. 558) claim that “the emergence relation from [P ] to S cannot
properly be viewed as causal”. Kim asks, rhetorically, “How can there be a causal chain
from [e.g.] pain to the hand motion that is separate and independent from the physical
causal chain from the neural state to the motion of the hand?” (fn. 7). This would indeed
be strange against the assumption of Physicalism, and the associated closure claim that
every lower-level physically acceptable e↵ect has a purely lower-level physically acceptable
cause; however, the robust emergentist’s strategy encoded in Strong emergence just is to
deny the closure claim, rather maintaining that the production of some physically accept-
able e↵ect requires (the manifestation of) powers not had by any lower-level physically
acceptable feature. That said, Kim is clearly right that causation and causal dependence
cannot characterize physically acceptable emergence, since such a nomologically “gener-
ative” connection does not ensure that the powers of emergent and lower-level features
stand in the proper subset relation requisite for Weak emergence.
2.4 Non-reductive realization
The second metaphysically robust notion of emergent dependence is in terms of real-
ization. While there are many accounts of this notion, all have in common the aim of
characterizing a realized entity as “nothing over and above” its realizing entity (or en-
tities), compatible (given the physical acceptability of base entities) with Physicalism.
Some physicalists moreover think that such nothing over-and-aboveness is compatible
with a realized feature’s being emergent. Hence Gillett (2002b) sees the project of estab-
lishing the possibility of emergence as “deeply interwoven with the project of vindicating
non-reductive physicalism as a viable position” (p. 102).
A realization-based conception of emergent dependence is indeed well-suited for phys-
icalist purposes, in that the standard accounts of realization each have understandings on
which their holding guarantees satisfaction of the conditions of Weak emergence. Here I
consider a representative sample.
First, consider a “functionalizability” account, according to which realized features are
second-order features, having causal roles played by the lower-level features that realize
them on a given occasion (see Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974, Papineau 1993, Antony and
Levine 1997, Melnyk 2003, and others). Now, to be associated with a distinctive causal
role is just to be associated with a distinctive set of powers; hence if the distinctive
causal role of a realized feature is, on a given occasion, played by a lower-level realizing
feature, every token power of the higher-level feature, on that occasion, will be numerically
identical with a token power of the feature upon which it synchronically depends, on that
occasion. This much su ces, as previously argued, for the physical acceptability of a
functionally realized feature, as per Physicalism. Still, one might think that functional
realization is incompatible with Weak emergence, on grounds that a functionally realized
feature inherits all of the token powers of its realizing feature:
A functional reduction of pain has the following causal and ontological impli-
cations: Each occurrence of pain has the causal powers of its neural realizer;
thus if pain occurs by being realized by N , this occurrence of pain has the
16
causal powers of N . [. . . ] In general, if M occurs by being realized by N on a
given occasion, the M -instance has the causal powers of the N -instance (Kim
2006, p. 554).
Where a functional role may be played by multiple realizers, however there is a case
to be made that a functionally realized feature has, on a given occasion, only a proper
subset of the token powers of the feature realizing it on that occasion. To see this, recall
the analogy initially motivating functionism (see, e.g., Putnam 1967), to cases where
multiple hardware systems may implement the instructions associated with a given piece
of software. Here the realizing systems are similar in each having whatever powers are
needed to implement the software, but are di↵erent in having other powers associated with
their distinctive hardware bases. More generally, in cases where a type of functionally
characterized higher-level feature may be multiply realized, it is plausible that each of its
realizing types will have all of the powers associated with its functional role, and more
besides.15 Correspondingly, a proper subset relation will hold between the powers of the
realized type and those of any of its realizing types. This relation between powers will
hold on any occasion of realization involving tokens of the types; hence an account of
emergent dependence in terms of functional realization will conform to Weak emergence.
Second, consider powers-based accounts of realization (see Wilson 1999, Shoemaker
2001, Clapp 2001). On Shoemaker’s account,
Property X realizes property Y just in case the conditional powers bestowed
by Y are a subset of the conditional powers bestowed by X (and X is not a
conjunctive property having Y as a conjunct).
Shoemaker moreover claims:
Where the realized property is multiply realizable, the conditional powers
bestowed by it will be a proper subset of the sets bestowed by each of the
realizer properties (pp. 78-9).
His motivations here parallel those used to motivate the same claim for functionally re-
alized properties. In brief, higher-level features are associated with distinctive sets of
powers; if such a feature is multiply realized, then its realizing types will share the pow-
ers of the realized type, but will di↵er in respect of further powers. This relation will
plausibly hold on any occasion of realization of tokens of the types; hence an account
of emergent dependence in terms of powers-based realization (and the associated “part-
whole” accounts of type or token features that Shoemaker and Clapp associate with their
accounts) will conform to Weak emergence.16
Finally, consider accounts of non-reductive realization in terms of the determinable/determinate
relation (see Yablo 1992, Wilson 2009), the relation of increased specificity paradigmati-
cally holding between colors and their shades. Plausibly, as is reflected in Yablo’s claim
15See, e.g., the discussion in Antony and Levine (1997).
16Note that nothing in the preceding line of thought requires acceptance of any particular account of
the metaphysics of properties. As previously, the physical acceptability of a higher-level feature hinges
solely on the relations between its token powers and those of its base feature on a given occasion; as such,
issues of physical realization are independent of whether features have non-causal quiddities; and one may
correspondingly also maintain that issues of physical realization are independent of whether the actual
powers of a given feature are essentially or exhaustively individuative of it.
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that determinables and determinates “are not causal rivals” (p. 259) and as is developed
in Wilson 1999 and 2009, every token power of a determinable feature is identical with
a token power of the more determinate feature(s) upon which it synchronically depends.
Again, one might be concerned that such an account of realization is incompatible with
Weak emergence, on grounds that instances of determinables and associated determinates
are token-identical (see MacDonald and MacDonald 1986 and Ehring 1996); for in that
case a higher-level feature will inherit all of the token powers of the feature that realizes it
on that occasion. But here too, there is a case to be made that instances of determinables
have only a proper subset of the token powers of the features that determine them on a
given occasion. Plausibly, a given determinable will be associated with a distinctive set
of powers; moreover, this determinable will typically be “multiply determined” by asso-
ciated determinates; distinct determinates of the determinable will share the powers of
the determinable, but will di↵er in respect of other of their powers. Moreover, insofar as
determinables are distinctively unspecific, this characteristic should be preserved in their
instances; but if a determinable token is identical with a determinate token on a given
occasion, the former have all the token powers of the latter, and this distinctive lack of
specificity will be lost. This provides another reason to suppose that a determinable token
will have only a proper subset of the powers of their associated determinate token on any
given occasion, in conformity with Weak emergence.
2.5 Results
We have arrived at the following results concerning accounts of emergent dependence:
⇠ Conceptions of emergent depenent in terms of material composition are compatible
with either Weak or Strong emergence, as well as with ontological reduction.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of asymmetrical minimally nomological supervenience rules
out ontological reduction, and is compatible with either Weak or Strong emergence.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of mere nomological supervenience aim to conform only to
Strong emergence, and conceptions in terms of metaphysical supervenience aims to
conform only to Weak emergence; however, there are cases to be made that either
strength of modal correlation is compatible with either schema; blocking all the cases
require endorsing controversial theses (the rejection of quiddities, Hume’s dictum)
which moreover appear to be incompatible.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of causation and causal dependence aim to conform to Strong
emergence.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of realization aim to conform to Weak emergence.
3 Emergent autonomy: metaphysical conceptions
I turn now to considering metaphysical accounts of emergent autonomy in light of the two
schemas for emergence.
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3.1 Ontological and causal autonomy
Causal autonomy (distinctive causal e cacy) guarantees ontological autonomy (distinct-
ness), by Leibniz’s law. But for reasons previously noted, ontological autonomy does
not guarantee causal autonomy. Causal autonomy is necessary, however, for vindicating
the ontological and causal autonomy of special science entities, and relatedly, for solving
the problem of higher-level causation in a way preserving both the dependence and the
distinctive causal e cacy of higher-level entities. Hence an account of metaphysical emer-
gence aiming to accomplish these goals must do so in virtue of causal di↵erences between
higher-level and base features, rather than in virtue of any “bare” ontological di↵erences
there may be between these features.
This observation is crucial in appropriately interpreting accounts of emergent au-
tonomy. Consider, for example, the conception of emergent entities as being “new” or
“genuinely novel” with respect to their base entities:
[Emergence involves] a new kind of relatedness (Morgan 1923, p. 19)
[Emergence involves] a new quality [. . . ] distinctive of the higher-complex
(Alexander 1920, p. 45)
[A]t each new level of complexity entirely new properties appear (Anderson
1972, p. 393)
What seems to be central to our conception of emergent phenomena is the
idea that something genuinely novel is present in the emergent entity that is
not present in entities that are prior to it (Humphreys 1996, p. X)
All such conceptions need to make explicit that the novelty/di↵erence at issue has causal
as well as ontological implications. Note that mere adherence to Alexander’s Dictum
(a.k.a. the Eleatic Principle)—that real (broadly scientific) properties have powers—will
not in itself establish that a novel/di↵erent feature has the desired causal autonomy. A
stronger conception of emergent autonomy is needed, establishing that novel/di↵erent
emergent features have either powers or power profiles di↵erent from those had by their
base features.
Here I will consider five common ways in which emergentists fill in the notions of
novelty/di↵erence so as to gain causal as well as ontological autonomy, by appeal to:
(1) fundamental powers, forces, laws; (2) non-additivity of e↵ects; (3) downward causal
e cacy; (4) imposition of lower-level constraints; and (5) multiple realizability and its
variants. As we will see, individual variants on these strategies aim to characterize emer-
gent autonomy as involving either fundamental or non-fundamental novelty/di↵erence,
along lines encoded in Strong and Weak emergence, respectively.
3.2 Fundamental powers, forces, laws
The notions of ontological novelty or di↵erence are sometimes supplemented by appeal to
fundamentality (ontological basicness):
A fundamental property is an ontologically basic property of a basic entity
[. . . ] An ontologically-emergent property is an ontologically basic property of
a complex entity. (Cunningham 2001, p. S67)
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[Emergence involves] a fundamentally new kind of feature. (O’Connor and
Wong 2005, p. 665)
An appeal to fundamentality is in the right direction, but still does not make the requisite
causal implications explicit, since a feature might be fundamentally new in having a
fundamentally new non-causal quiddity.
It is appropriate, then, that accounts of emergent autonomy as involving fundamental
novelty/di↵erence more specifically take this to involve fundamentally new powers, forces,
or laws. Such conceptions are characteristic of British Emergentism as “the doctrine that
there are fundamental powers to influence motion associated with types of structures of
particles that compose certain chemical, biological, and psychological kinds” McLaughlin
1992, p. 52. As McLaughlin goes on to note, these powers were typically taken to be pow-
ers to “generate fundamental forces not generated by any pairs of elementary particles”
(p. 71). Relatedly, British Emergentists commonly took emergent features to be governed
by fundamental laws (tracking or otherwise associated with the having of new powers to
produce fundamental forces, etc.). Hence Broad (1925) says:
[T]he law connecting the properties of silver-chloride with those of silver and
of chlorine and with the structure of the compound is, so far as we know, an
unique and ultimate law. (Broad, 64-5)
Appeal to fundamentally new powers, forces, or laws is similarly a theme in contempo-
rary accounts of emergent autonomy. So, for example, Silberstein and McGeever (1999)
understand emergent features as having irreducible causal capacities (that is, fundamen-
tally new powers):
Ontologically emergent features are features of systems or wholes that possess
causal capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic causal capacities of the
parts nor to any of the (reducible) relations between the parts. (p. 186)
O’Connor and Wong (2005) similarly make explicit that emergent features are “funda-
mentally new” specifically in having new causal capacities:
[A]s a fundamentally new kind of feature, [an emergent feature] will confer
causal capacities on the object that go beyond the summation of capacities
directly conferred by the objects microstructure. (p. 665)
And reflecting that powers are plausibly grounded in fundamental forces/interactions,
Wilson (2002) o↵ers a fundamental interaction-relative account of emergence, according
to which (in present terms) a dependent higher-level feature S is emergent from its base
feature P , relative to a set of fundamental interactions F , just in case S has a token power
di↵erent from any token powers of P grounded only in forces/interactions in F .
Accounts on which emergent autonomy involves fundamentally new powers, forces
or laws all conform to Strong, and not Weak emergence. Accounts on which emergent
features have fundamentally new powers explicitly do so, and the other accounts implicitly
do so, since these accounts entail that emergent features will have new powers to generate
fundamental forces/interactions, and in virtue of which they will enter into fundamental
laws.
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3.2.1 The flip side: failure of realizability
Under the rubric of emergent autonomy as involving fundamental powers, forces, or laws
we may also place negative conceptions of emergent autonomy as involving a failure of
realizability. So, for example, Kim (2006) identifies “irreducibility of emergents” as a
necessary condition of emergence, where this is understood in terms of failure of functional
realizability:
Property M is emergent from a set of properties N1, . . . , Nn only if M is not
functionally reducible with the set of the Ns as its realizer. (p. 555)17
As above (§2.4), standard accounts of (non-reductive) realization all guarantee satis-
faction of the condition, in Weak emergence, that the token powers of emergent and base
features stand in the proper subset relation. Putting aside epiphenomenalism, then, an
account of emergent autonomy as involving failure of (any such account of) realization
will entail that an emergent entity has a new power, as per Strong emergence.
3.3 Non-additivity
Mill characterized emergent autonomy in terms of a failure of causal additivity. As we’ll
shortly see (§3.3.1), in the British Emergentist tradition such appeals are aimed at provid-
ing a (negative) metaphysical criterion for fundamental powers (and associated forces or
laws); such conceptions of emergent autonomy thus conform to Strong emergence. As we’ll
also see, however, certain contemporary understandings of non-additivity, as grounded in
non-linearity associated with, e.g., chaotic dynamical systems (§3.3.2), or in powers that
latently exist at the microphysical level (§3.3.3), have been associated with Weak emer-
gence. I’ll address each of these approaches, in turn.
3.3.1 Non-additivity as a criterion for fundamentality
As previously discussed, Mill (“On the Composition of Causes”, 1843/1973) distinguishes
two types of e↵ects of joint or composite causes. “homopathic” e↵ects conform to the
principle of “composition of causes” in being (in some sense) mere sums of the e↵ects of
the component causes when acting in relative isolation, as when the weight of two massy
objects on a scale is the scalar sum of their individual weights, or when the joint operation
of two forces conforms to vector addition in bringing an object to the same place it would
have ended up, had the forces operated sequentially. “Heteropathic” e↵ects violate the
principle in not being mere sums in the previous sense, and are therefore indicative of the
operation of new laws. Mill says:
This di↵erence between the case in which the joint e↵ect of causes is the sum
of their separate e↵ects, and the case in which it is heterogeneous to them;
between laws which work together without alteration, and laws which, when
called upon to work together, cease and give place to others; is one of the
fundamental distinctions in nature. (p. 408–409)
17Note that Kim here, somewhat uncharacteristically, takes the ‘one-many’ perspective on emergence.
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And he o↵ers chemical compounds and living bodies as entities that are capable of pro-
ducing heteropathic e↵ects.
Mill did not use the term “emergence” (evidently Lewes 1875 first did so), but his
notion of heteropathic e↵ects serves as a basis for characterizing Strong emergence. To
start: given the reciprocal connection between powers and e↵ects, to say that an e↵ect of
a feature of a composite entity is non-additive, relative to e↵ects of features of the parts
acting separately, is just to say that the higher-level feature has a power not had by its
lower-level base features when in additive combination (taking the many-one perspective)
or, equivalently, that the higher-level feature has a power not had by its relational lower-
level base feature (taking the one-one perspective). Mill himself moves seamlessly from
talk of heteropathic e↵ects to talk of new properties of and laws governing entities capable
of causing such e↵ects:
[W]here the principle of Composition of Causes [. . . ] fails [. . . ] the concur-
rence of causes is such as to determine a change in the properties of the body
generally, and render it subject to new laws, more or less dissimilar to those
to which it conformed in its previous state (p. 435).
Both Mill’s reference to “new laws” and his taking such cases to contrast with “the
extensive and important class of phenomena commonly called mechanical” indicate that
Mill’s appeal to non-additivity of e↵ects is aimed at identifying a criterion for a higher-
level feature’s having a new fundamental power, enabling it (or its possessing “body”) to
override the usual composition laws in the production of certain e↵ects. As McLaughlin
(1992) notes, “Mill holds that collocations of agents can possess fundamental force-giving
properties” (p. X). All this is in conformity with Strong, and not Weak, emergence.
Most other British Emergentists followed Mill in characterizing emergent autonomy
as involving violations of broadly additive composition laws, including Alexander (1920),
who characterized emergent properties as having powers to produce heteropathic e↵ects;
Morgan (1923), who contrasted resultant with emergent features as being “additive and
subtractive only”; and Broad (1925), who o↵ered scalar and vector addition as paradigms
of the compositional principles whose violation was characteristic of emergence. An in-
teresting exception to this rule is found in Lewes’ (1875) characterization of emergent
autonomy as involving any failure of “general mathematizability”, with emergence being
correspondingly harder to come by. As in Mill’s case, and following the standard British
Emergentist conception of emergent autonomy as involving fundamental powers, forces,
or laws, these appeals to non-additivity are best seen as attempts to provide a substan-
tive metaphysical criterion of fundamentality, in conformity with Strong, and not Weak,
emergence.
3.3.2 Non-additivity and non-linearity
Though British Emergentists saw non-additivity as characteristic of Strong emergence,
some contemporary accounts of emergent autonomy (see Newman 1996 and Bedau 1997)
take non-additivity of the sort associated with non-linear features of complex systems
(e.g., being in the basin of a strange attractor) as motivating a conception of emergence
compatible with Physicalism. What accounts for this discrepancy in the status as physi-
cally acceptable, or not, of non-additive higher-level features?
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We should start by noting that certain motivations for taking non-linear phenomena
to be physically acceptable do not establish this claim. Newman (1996), for example, cites
the fact that complex systems are “strictly deterministic” in support; but strict determin-
ism of non-linear systems does not rule out such systems as being Strongly emergent, for
in the first instance such determination is a matter of nomological necessity, and as pre-
viously, all emergentists agree that emergent features (and associated powers to produce
systemic behaviors) are (at least) nomologically necessitated by base features. Relat-
edly, that macro-states of non-linear systems are “derivable” from non-linear equations
and initial (more generally, external) conditions does not establish physical acceptabil-
ity, since it remains to consider the metaphysical basis for non-linearity (and associated
equations). Bedau (1997) claims that features of non-linear systems are physically ac-
ceptable because “structural” (e↵ectively: are features of relational lower-level entities);
but given that non-linear phenomena do not consist solely in additive combinations of
micro-level goings-on, the claim that such features are merely structural needs to be es-
tablished, not assumed. What is needed to warrant taking non-linear phenomena to be
physically acceptable is specific attention to the metaphysical basis for the non-linearity,
and some argument to the e↵ect that this basis does not involve new fundamental powers
(or associated forces/interactions or laws).
Along these lines, it is worth noting that some accounts of the metaphysical basis for
non-linearity are compatible with Strong emergence, contra Physicalism. Consider, for ex-
ample, cases where the non-linear phenomena involves feedback between the micro-entities
constituting the base, associated with strange attractors and other dynamic phenomena.
As Silberstein and McGeever (1999) note, one metaphysical account of non-linearity (again
compatible with “strict determinism”) appeals to a kind of system-level holism:
What is the causal story behind the dynamics of strange attractors, or behind
dynamical autonomy? The answer, it seems to us, must be the non-linearity
found in chaotic systems. [. . . ] But why is non-linearity so central? [. . . ]
Non-linear relations may be an example of what Teller calls ‘relational holism’
[. . . ]. (p. 197)
As above (§3.2), Silberstein and McGeever take the associated holism as indicative of
emergent features’ possessing fundamentally new powers (“irreducible causal capacities”).
Such an account of the metaphysical basis of non-linear emergence is again in line only
with Strong emergence.
Proponents of non-linearity as characteristic of Weak emergence have a di↵erent in-
terpretation in mind, typically illustrated by attention to one or more specific examples
(often involving cellular autonomata). The general moral to be drawn from these exam-
ples is that (pace traditional appeals to failures of additivity) a metaphysical account
of non-linearity need not involve fundamental higher-level powers or laws, but rather
only micro-level goings-on (notwithstanding that the aggregative result of such micro-
interactions can be very surprising), compatible with Physicalism.
Granting this moral, a remaining, underappreciated, and more serious problem for tak-
ing non-linearity as characteristic of Weak emergence concerns whether the higher-level
features at issue are plausibly understood as being ontologically and causally autonomous
from their base entities, in having only a proper subset of the powers of their base enti-
ties. Indeed, both Newman and Bedau maintain that non-linear features are in-principle
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reducible to micro-level phenomena, though Bedau attempts to ground a measure of
higher-level autonomy in certain broadly metaphysical constraints on the predictability
of non-linear and other phenomena supposed to instance weak emergence. We’ll consider
Bedau’s account of such autonomy down the line (§4.2). Here I want to focus on another
aspect of non-linear phenomena, also noted by Bedau:
[T]here is a clear sense in which the behaviors of weak emergent phenomena
are autonomous with respect to the underlying processes. The sciences of com-
plexity are discovering simple, general macro-level patterns and laws involving
weak emergent phenomena. [. . . ] In general, we can formulate and investigate
the basic principles of weak emergent phenomena only by empirically observ-
ing them at the macro-level. In this sense, then, weakly emergent phenomena
have an autonomous life at the macro-level. (p. 395)
That non-linear phenomena associated with complex dynamical systems give rise to “sim-
ple, general macro-level patterns” may indeed provide a basis for the ontological and causal
autonomy of the associated higher-level features, compatible with Physicalism, quite apart
from how such patterns may be discovered.
Here we are motivated to attend to a second way in which higher-level phenomena
may be ontologically novel or di↵erent—namely, as being non-fundamentally novel or
di↵erent. And given that this form of di↵erence must have causal implications, if it is
to be characteristic of emergence, the strategy for establishing that features entering into
higher-level patterns have the desired form of autonomy is clear: one must establish,
first, that the macro-level patterns are di↵erent from (in being, plausibly, more “general”
or less “specific” than) those at the micro-level, and second, that the correct account
of this di↵erence entails that the target (token) higher-level features have only proper
subsets of the powers of their (token) base features, as per Weak emergence. One strategy
for establishing that the requisite proper subset relation is in place might appeal to the
higher-level features’ being functionally or otherwise multiply realizable, and so having
causal roles that are indeed more general than those of their realizers, in being associated
with fewer of the latter’s powers. Another strategy, which I will discuss in §3.5, may be
implemented even if a given non-linear feature is only singly realizable.
In any case, proponents of non-additivity as a basis for physically acceptable emergence
need to establish that the requisite autonomy is in place, and, it seems clear, should
dispense with claims of in-principle ontological and causal reducibility. Such claims of
reducibility may be motivated by thinking that in-principle ontological reducibility is
required for Physicalism; but this motivation is suspect, given the seeming viability of the
non-reductive physicalist’s strategy for resolving the problem of higher-level causation,
encoded in the schema for Weak emergence.
3.3.3 Non-additivity and micro-latency
Yet another understanding of the source of non-additivity is as involving the manifesta-
tion of powers that are existent, but latent, at the micro-physical level. For example,
Shoemaker (2002) distinguishes between “micro-manifest” and “micro-latent” powers of
lower-level entities, and suggests that emergent features have (“Type-2”) powers that are
latent at the micro-physical level:
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When micro-entities are combined in an emergence engendering way, the re-
sulting object will apparently have two sorts of micro-structural properties.
One sort, call these provisionally Type-1 micro-structural properties, will con-
sist of properties that can be specified entirely in terms of the micro-manifest
powers of the constituent micro-entities together with how these micro-entities
are related–i.e., in terms of what could be known about them prior to their en-
tering into emergence engendering combinations. [. . . ] The other sort, which I
will provisionally call Type-2 micro-structral properties, will be properties that
are specified in terms of all of the powers, micro-latent and micro-manifest,
of the constituent micro-entities. [. . . ] Type-2 micro-structural properties,
although they are micro-structural, will be emergent properties. [. . . ] If emer-
gentism is false, manifest causal powers are the only ones the micro-entities
have, and physical micro-structural properties are the only ones macro-objects
have—and the other properties of macro-objects are realized in their physical
micro-structural properties. (p. 55)
The underlying suggestion here is that, while emergent features may be non-additive (have
powers to produce non-additive e↵ects) relative to micro-manifest powers, this need not
impugn their physical acceptability; Gillett (2002b) o↵ers a similar account as “vindicat-
ing non-reductive physicalism as a viable position” (p. 102). Interestingly, Shoemaker
traces the suggestion to Broad (1925), who seems to have taken the view that the powers
of emergent features are micro-latent as a variant on the view that emergence involves
violation of composition laws and associated coming into play of ‘trans-physical’ laws, as
per Strong, and notWeak, emergence. So here again the question arises whether emergent
autonomy as involving non-additivity is or is not compatible with Physicalism.
In answering this question, we should first note that the mere existence of micro-latent
powers does not su ce to render emergent features physically acceptable, for proponents
of Strong emergence will generally agree that in some broad sense physical entities have
latent powers to bring about emergent features:
[I]t is true in an emergentist scenario that everything that occurs rests on
the complete dispositional profile of the physical properties prior to the onset
of emergent features. For the later occurrence of any emergent properties are
contained (to some probabilistic measure) within that profile, and so the e↵ects
of the emergent features are indirectly a consequence of the physical proper-
ties, too. [. . . ] The di↵erence that emergence makes is that what happens
transcends the immediate [. . . ] interactions of the microphysics. (O’Connor
and Wong 2005, p. 669)
Such a weak dispositional understanding of micro-latent powers is compatible with micro-
goings-on’ being preconditions for the occurrence of new fundamental powers, forces/interactions,
or laws at the higher-level, contra Physicalism. Indeed, Broad’s assumption that emer-
gence had anti-materialist implications indicates that he had such a weak dispositional
sense in mind, in allowing that micro-physical entities have latent powers that become
manifest when in “emergence-engendering” combinations. Physicalist proponents of micro-
latent powers as a metaphysical basis for failures in additivity thus need to identify a more
substantive understanding of micro-latency, which blocks a Strong emergent reading of
apparent failures of additivity.
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The prospects for their doing this are unclear, however. To start, it isn’t enough to
specify, as Shoemaker does, that the e↵ects of micro-level dispositions also be micro-level,
since this is compatible with the conditions of manifestation of the micro-level disposition
involving physically unacceptable goings-on. Gillett (2002b) more explicitly recognizes
the concern, and attempts to block it, as follows:
In our broached scenario [. . . ] the fundamental micro-physical properties have
such conditional powers which they contribute conditionally upon instantiat-
ing certain realized properties. In such a case, a realized property instance thus
determines that one of its realizer properties contributes a certain power that
it would not otherwise contribute. It is important to mark the non-causal na-
ture of the determination exerted by the realized property in such a scenario,
for this suggests that there will likely be no new ontologically fundamental
forces (or other properties). The relevant realized property instance, ‘’H’, is
not causing a microphysical property instance, ‘P ’, to contribute certain pow-
ers. Causal relations typically are mediated by forces and/or the transfer of
energy—thus if H causally determined P ’s contribution of powers then there
might well be a new force. But in the scenario, H is exerting a non-causal
determinative influence.
One problem here is that, even on the Strong emergentist interpretation of non-additivity,
the weak dispositional micro-latent powers will not be “caused” by the higher-level feature:
new fundamental interactions do not cause, but rather enter into constituting, the new
powers for which they serve as a (perhaps partial) ground. The deeper problem, however,
is that Gillett is stipulating that, rather than explaining how or why, the powers occurrent
in “emergence-engendering” combinations might not involve (either causally or constitu-
tively) any fundamental higher-level interactions or the like. The question remains: how
are we to make sense of the claim that such powers are compatible with Physicalism,
given that these powers do not make an appearance in the laws of fundamental physics
(which deals only with micro-entities in relatively non-complex combination) and given
that they cannot be understood as additive combinations of powers which do make such
an appearance?
What the proponent of micro-latency needs to do in order to establish that non-
additivity is compatible with Physicalism is to make a case that fundamental physical laws
might themselves entail violations in higher-level composition laws when micro-entities
enter into emergence-engendering combinations. It is unclear how this can be estab-
lished however, since composition laws (incorporating, e.g., scalar and vector addition,
along with other “ontologically lightweight”—boolean, mereological—modes of combina-
tion plausibly preserving physical acceptability) appear to exhaustively encode the broadly
additive ways in which micro-manifest entities might combine while preserving physical
acceptability. At the very least, at present it remains unclear how (metaphysical) non-
additivity might fit with the usual understanding of Physicalism as the thesis that all
broadly scientific goings-on are nothing over and above the goings-on explicitly (and not
just “latently”) at issue in fundamental physics.
Relatedly, there is reason to avoid characterizing physically acceptable emergence in
terms of micro-latent features. Traditionally, the dispute between physicalists (of all
stripes) and robust emergentists has turned on whether or not all broadly scientific goings-
on are “nothing over and above” goings-on that are manifest at the micro-level, when
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micro-entities are not in “emergence-engendering” combinations. From this perspective,
a characterization of Weak emergence as involving micro-latent powers is not in the spirit
of Physicalism. As Clarke (1999) notes, if higher-level features have token powers not
identical with those of their base features . . .
. . . emergent causal powers would be due to (bestowed by) some macro-level,
structural properties possessed by the complex object [. . . ] It matters little
whether the macro-level properties that are acknowledged to carry emergent
powers are said to be physical properties or whether the emergent laws are
said to be physical laws; if there are emergent powers, then the kind of micro-
explanation that is the ambition of most physicalists, an explanation of the
behavior of all objects in terms of micro-level properties and relations and
micro-level laws, will be impossible. (p. 309)
As such, it is no surprise that Broad did not feel the need to rule out the micro-latent
interpretation in taking apparent violations of composition laws to have anti-materialist
implications.
3.4 Downward causal e cacy
Many accounts of emergent causal autonomy require that such autonomy be specifically
with respect to lower-level goings-on. Hence Morgan (1923) says:
But when some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say, at the level of
life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course
is di↵erent in virtue of its presence—di↵erent from what it would have been
if life had been absent. (p. 15)
In a series of papers, Sperry (1969, 1986, 1976) suggests that conscious mental phenomena
are emergent in causally a↵ecting underlying neurophysical states, as does Searle (1992).
More generally, as Kim (2006) observes, “downward causation is of paramount importance
to the emergentists. For they want to claim that the emergence of consciousness and
rational thought has made a fundamental di↵erence to the world at the physical level”
(p. 558).18
Unclarity over whether downward causation is compatible with Physicalism is a main
source of unclarity over whether emergence is compatible with Physicalism. There is,
perhaps, a prima facie appearance of incompatibility:
Of all the marks of emergence [downward causation] is the one which presents
the clearest and most direct challenge to micro-determinism. (Klee 1984, p. 58)
On the other hand, commentators disagree—sometimes over a single account—over whether
downward causation is so incompatible.
Sperry’s account is a nice case in point. On the one hand, Sperry (1976) speaks of
downward influence as involving higher-level powers:
18That said, Kim thinks that the supposition of downward causation is problematic, for reasons we will
consider in §3.4.1.
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The conscious subjective properties in our present view are interpreted to have
causal potency in regulating the course of brain events; that is, the mental
forces or properties exert a regulative control influence in brain physiology.
(1976, 44)
McLaughlin (1992) interprets such talk as committing Sperry to an account involving
fundamental configurational forces, hence as incompatible with Physicalism. On the other
hand, Sperry (1969) describes downward influence as analogous to that involved when the
atoms in a wheel must go where the wheel goes:
The subjective mental phenomena are conceived to influence and to govern
the flow of nerve tra c by virtue of their encompassing emergent properties.
Individual nerve impulses and other excitatory components of a cerebral ac-
tivity pattern are simply carried along or shunted this way and that by the
prevailing overall dynamics of the whole active process (in principle—just as
drops of water are carried along by a local eddy in a stream or the way the
molecules and atoms of a wheel are carried along when it rolls downhill . . . ”
(p. 532)
Schroder (1998) (following Klee’s 1984 suggestion) interprets this analogy as suggesting
that downward causation involves not new powers, but lower-level constraints: “we can
see what is wrong with a critique of emergentism that castigates it for assuming ‘config-
urational forces’ [. . . ]. Emergentists who adopt downwards causation as a criterion for
emergent properties need assume no such force. [. . . ] In order to produce live and mind-
ful beings, what is needed is not special laws but special structures that constrain the
sequence of possible events in special ways” (p. 449). Searle’s (1992) account of “radical”
emergence, which is supposed both to involve new powers and to be no more physically
problematic than, say, liquidity, has produced a similar degree of interpretive confusion.
A plausible diagnosis of this confusion reflects that there are two ways for a higher-level
feature to be downwardly causally e cacious: one conforming toWeak emergence and one
conforming to Strong emergence. Confusion concerning Sperry’s and Searle’s accounts is
then plausibly located in these authors’ failing to su ciently disambiguate which form of
downward causation (hence of emergence) they have in mind, as with Sperry’s remarks,
above.
That downward causation may be interpreted in line with Strong emergence is clear:
one simply additionally requires that the new power associated with a Strongly emergent
feature be associated with the production of lower-level e↵ects. Similarly for a version of
emergence discussed by Chalmers (2006) involving “a sort of incompleteness of physical
laws even in characterizing the systematic evolution of low-level processes” and which he
thinks is best understood “as involving a sort of downward causation”. Here the appeal
to downward causation may be seen as providing an account of the specific way in which
Strongly emergent features are fundamentally novel or distinct.
Alternatively, downward causation may be interpreted along Weak emergent lines, as
involving the holding of certain physically acceptable constraints on lower-level entities;
here the appeal to downward may be seen as providing an account of the specific way in
which Weakly emergent features are non-fundamentally novel or distinct. That said, as
with appeals to non-linearity it is not obvious that such downwardly e cacious features
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have the requisite ontological or causal autonomy, even granting that they inherit the
physical acceptability of their base features. To the prima facie contrary: might not a
given (token) feature of the wheel in virtue of which it rolls, on a given occasion, be
identified with a (token) feature of the relational lower-level entity (consisting of atoms
standing in atomic relation) constituting the wheel on that occasion? We will revisit this
issue when considering conceptions of emergent autonomy that more directly appeal to
the imposition of constraints (§3.5); there I will sketch a strategy that may work to gain
autonomy in at least some cases of constraint-based downward causation. The broader
moral at present is that additional work needs to be done to establish that features
associated with lower-level constraints are non-fundamentally autonomous in the way
required for physically acceptable emergence.
3.4.1 Kim’s concerns about downward causation
The latter issue is key to Kim’s concerns about downward causation and his associated
exclusion argument, which aim to establish that non-reductive physicalism must collapse
either into reductive physicalism or expand into robust emergentism (see, e.g., his 1989,
1993a, and 1998). As Kim correctly notes, blocking the robust emergentist’s under-
standing of higher-level features requires accepting what he calls the “Causal inheritance
principle”, according to which every token power of a realized property instanced on a
given occasion is numerically identical with a token power of the property instance realiz-
ing it on that occasion; and the challenge he has o↵ered to the non-reductive physicalist
is to show how, if token higher-level features have no powers not already had by token
realizers, the former may be ontologically and causally (in particular, downward causally)
e cacious. Certainly it is hard to see how such autonomy might be gained if higher-
level instances inherit all the powers of their realizing instances. However, the explicit
identification of Weak emergence as encoding the non-reductive physicalist’s distinctive
approach to higher-level causal autonomy, at least makes clear what the non-reductive
physicalist needs to do in order to address Kim’s concerns about downward causation.
First, the non-reductive physicalist must establish that it su ces for causal autonomy
that a higher-level feature have a distinctive power profile, as per the proper subset con-
dition in Weak emergence; second, they must establish that at least some higher-level
features in fact have distinctive power profiles. As noted, non-reductive physicalists do
have resources along these lines, but whether these strategies succeed is the subject of
ongoing debate.
3.5 The imposition of constraints
Closely related to physicalist conceptions of emergent autonomy in terms of downward
causation are conceptions on which such autonomy is taken to reflect the imposition of
lower-level constraints (see Klee 1984, Schroder 1998, and Wilson 2010a).
To repeat, granting that features associated with the imposition of lower-level con-
straints conform to Physicalism, it is not obvious that such features have the requisite
ontological or causal autonomy; hence additional argument is needed to show that this
conception conforms toWeak emergence. I provide a detailed such argument, for a special
class of features associated with lower-level constraints, in Wilson 2010a. Here I sketch,
very briefly, the strategy of that argument.
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To start, I consider the notion of a degree of freedom (DOF)—roughly, one of a min-
imal set of independent parameters needed to characterize the states upon which the
law-governed features of a (token of a given type of) entity (including systems) function-
ally depends.19 Attention to DOF is useful in the present context, because the imposition
of constraints at a lower-level generally a↵ects, one way or another, the DOF needed
to characterize the higher-level entities whose existence is to some extent determined by
the holding of the constraints. Some sorts of changes in DOF resulting from the im-
position of lower-level constraints may not be indicative even of Weak emergence—for
example, cases where the DOF needed to characterize a higher-level entity (e.g., a rigid
body, or a molecule) are identical to those needed to characterize lower-level relational
entities realizing such higher-level entities, when the latter DOF can take on only con-
stant or a restricted range of values. However, sometimes the imposition of lower-level
constraints involves not just reductions or restrictions of (values of) lower-level DOF, but
moreover eliminates certain lower-level DOF from those needed to characterize the asso-
ciated higher-level entity. This is the case, for example, with certain features of quantum,
statistical-mechanical, and complex dynamical entities or systems. (Note that the present
strategy, supposing it works, would vindicate accounts of Weak emergence appealing to
non-linearity.)
In such cases of elimination of DOF, I argue, there are reasons to think that the
associated higher-level feature satisfies Weak emergence, in having only a proper subset of
the token powers of the relational lower-level feature upon which it depends. As above, the
usual strategy for showing this appeals to S’s (functional or other) multiple realizability.
Attention to DOF suggests a means of establishing satisfaction of Weak emergence even
if S is only singly realized. Suppose S is singly realized by a (relational lower-level) base
feature P (that is, a feature of a lower-level relational entity consisting in certain lower-
level entities standing in lower-level relations). Now, again, what powers an entity has
are plausibly a matter of what it can do; and the sciences are plausibly in the business
of expressing what the entities they treat can do. It follows that, plausibly, what powers
an entity has are expressed by the laws in the science treating it. The powers of S are
thus those expressed by the laws in the theory treating (constrained) entity S, while the
powers of P are those expressed by the laws in the more fundamental theory treating the
(relatively unconstrained) lower-level constituents of P—that is, the constituents of P as
existing both inside and outside the constraints associated with S. Consequently, the laws
of the theory treating S express what happens when certain lower-level entities stand in
relations associated with certain lower-level constraints, and the laws treating P express
what happens when certain lower-level entities stand both in these relations and in other
relations not associated with the constraints. Hence the relational base feature P has
more powers than S, and the proper subset relation between powers in Weak emergence
is appropriately taken to be in place.20
19So, for example, specifying the configuration state for a free point particle requires 3 independent
parameters (e.g., x, y, and z; or r, rho, and theta); hence a free point particle has 3 configuration DOF,
and a system of N free point particles has 3N configuration DOF. And specifying the kinematic state for
a free point particle requires 6 independent parameters: one for each configuration coordinate, and one
for the velocity along that coordinate; hence a free point particle has 6 kinematic DOF, and a system of
N free point particles has 6N kinematic DOF.
20For example, suppose that P is a quantum relational entity, and S is a classical entity singly realized
by P . Then the causal powers of S include all those powers to produce, either directly or indirectly, e↵ects
that can occur in the macroscopic limit. The realizing entity P has all these causal powers, and in addition
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Of course, this is only a sketch of how higher-level autonomy may be gained via the
imposition of lower-level constraints (see my paper for details). The larger point for
present purposes is that this or some other work needs to be done if such constraints are
to serve as the basis for Weak metaphysical emergence.
3.6 Multiple realizability and its variants
As previously discussed (§2.4), non-reductive physicalists commonly appeal to multiple
realizability in service of establishing the ontological and causal autonomy of higher-level
entities. Related conceptions are in terms of “dynamical autonomy”, where micro-level
changes do not make a causal di↵erence at the level of a system’s dynamics (Wimsatt
1996), and “compositional variance”, where the base entities of a given higher-level system
exhibit “a much greater degree of variance and fluctuation from moment to moment than
does the level of organization where [the higher-level entity] occurs” (Klee 1984, p. 48).
Why should multiple realizability, dynamical autonomy, or compositional variance
support ontological and causal autonomy? Making the case for autonomy is crucial, since
a now-standard reductionist strategy for accommodating multiple realizability and its
variants proceeds by identifying multiply realized types with the disjunctions of their
realizing types (see Clapp 2001). Plausibly, instances of a disjunctive type, on a given
occasion, are identical with instances of whatever disjunct is instanced on that occasion;
hence disjunctive identification blocks conformity to either Strong or Weak emergence.
That said, as above the reductive strategy for accommodating multiple realizability
and its variants may be resisted, in service of establishing that some higher-level realized
features are non-fundamentally novel or distinct, in a way having appropriate implications
for their causal autonomy. In particular, non-reductionists may understand multiple re-
alizability, and its dynamical and compositional variants, as tracking the higher-level
feature’s association with a distinctive causal role—that is, with a distinctive set of pow-
ers. Each lower-level realizer will have these powers (else it would not be a realizer),
and some others besides, reflecting lower-level causal potentialities which di↵er between it
and other lower-level realizers. Hence one may reasonably maintain that any instance of a
multiply realizable feature has only a proper subset of the token powers of the base feature
realizing it on that occasion, as Weak emergence requires. Correspondingly, conceptions
of emergent autonomy appealing to multiple realizability, dynamical autonomy and com-
positional variability are best understood as providing a plausible basis for establishing
that the proper subset condition in Weak emergence is met.
3.7 Results
We have arrived at the following results concerning metaphysical accounts of emergent
autonomy:
⇠ Conceptions of autonomy in terms of mere ontological novelty/di↵erence or fun-
damental novelty/di↵erence guarantee ontological autonomy (distinctness) but not
causal autonomy.
has all those powers to produce, either directly or indirectly, e↵ects that can occur in circumstances that
are not so constrained, and in which quantum physics is operative—for example, e↵ects occurring in
circumstances where no macro-entities can exist.
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⇠ Conceptions in terms of fundamentality of powers, forces, laws (and relatedly, con-
ceptions in terms of failure of realization) aim to conform to Strong emergence.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of non-additivity of e↵ects aim to conform to either Strong
or Weak emergence, depending on whether the source of the non-additivity (non-
linearity) involves new powers. A pressing need here is for those taking non-linearity
as a basis for physically acceptable emergence to establish that higher-level non-
linear features are ontologically and causally autonomous from their base features,
in satisfying the proper subset condition on powers in Weak emergence.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of downward causal e cacy aim to conform to either Strong or
Weak emergence, depending on whether the source of the downward e cacy involves
new powers, or rather merely involves the imposition of lower-level constraints. Here
too, it remains for those characterizing physically acceptable emergence in terms of
downward e cacy to establish that the requisite ontological and causal autonomy
is in place.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of the imposition of lower-level constraints aim to conform
to Weak emergence. Here too, it remains for those characterizing physically ac-
ceptable emergence in terms of lower-level constraints to establish that the requisite
ontological and causal autonomy is in place (though see Wilson 2010a).
⇠ Conceptions in terms of multiple realizability, dynamical autonomy and composi-
tional variance aim to conform to Weak emergence.
4 Emergent autonomy: cognitive conceptions
Many historical and contemporary accounts of emergent autonomy involve appeals to the
failure to hold of certain epistemological, representational, or conceptual connections, in-
cluding unpredictability (Popper and Eccles 1977), in-principle failure of predictability or
deducibility (Broad 1925), predictability, but only by simulation (Bedau 1997), and fail-
ure of representational or conceptual entailment (Smart 1981, Chalmers 1996, Van Gulick
2001). Such accounts are broadly cognitive in that they appeal to one or other failure
on the part of creatures like us (or suitably idealized versions of us) to recognize certain
connections as holding between certain higher-level and base features. For convenience,
then, I will speak broadly of such conceptions as “cognitive” conceptions.
With few exceptions, cognitive conceptions of emergent autonomy aim to characterize
metaphysical emergence. Typically, the relevant failures of cognitive connections are
supposed to be concomitants of novelty or ontological irreducibility (or both). This is
characteristic of, for example, Alexander’s (1920) understanding of emergent phenomena
as admitting “no explanation” because involving “brute empirical fact”; Kekes’ (1966)
understanding of emergence as involving a priori unpredictability of (claims about) higher-
level features from (claims about) lower-level structure, due to novelty of higher-level
property; and Kim’s (1999) characterization of emergence as involving the joint failure of
explanatory, predictive, and ontological reduction. Such conceptions may fall under the
rubrics of Weak or Strong emergence, respectively, depending on what ontological aspect
is at issue (as per §3).
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Here I want to focus attention on accounts of emergence that are primarily or in any
case o cially cashed in cognitive terms. Along the way, we will confirm both that those
endorsing cognitive conceptions typically aim to characterize metaphysical autonomy, and
that they take themselves to have reason to think this can be done in epistemological or
other cognitive terms. This is not true across the board, however; and I’ll close (§4.4) with
discussion of certain accounts of “non-reductive” physicalism which are explicitly cashed
in terms of failure of conceptual connection, and which are better seen as ontologically
reductive physicalist accounts aiming to make sense of our seeming inabilities to bridge
certain explanatory gaps.
4.1 Failure of in-principle deducibility
Broad’s o cial formulation of emergence (1925) is as follows:
The emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes, composed (say) of
constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other and that the charac-
teristic properties of the whole R(A,B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced
from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in isolation
or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A,B,C).21 (p. 64)
Though this formulation is in epistemological terms, the discussion preceding the formu-
lation makes clear that Broad’s appeal to failure of deducibility aims to characterize a
metaphysical notion of emergent autonomy.
Broad begins his discussion of emergence by observing a distinction between two kinds
of inter-level (“trans-ordinal”) laws, which distinction is also presented in seemingly epis-
temological terms. First are trans-ordinal laws holding “between physical properties and
properties at higher levels of the hierarchy which, while deducible in principle from a the-
ory of the physical properties alone, are not deducible in fact”. Second are trans-ordinal
laws that are moreover “trans-physical”, holding “between physical properties and prop-
erties at higher levels which are not deducible, even in principle, from a theory of the
physical properties alone”. Broad’s o cial formulation of emergence thus obliquely char-
acterizes the holding of trans-physical laws, by reference to the associated in-principle
failure of deducibility that he assumes attaches to such laws.
In turn, for Broad, the existence of trans-physical laws has clear metaphysical conse-
quences. That Broad supposes that trans-physical laws are at odds with a “mechanistic”
(materialistic, physicalistic) view is some indication of this. Yet more telling are Broad’s
previously cited remarks to the e↵ect that such laws are “unique and ultimate” (pp. 64-
5)—that is, fundamental. That Broad understands trans-physical laws as indicative of
metaphysical emergence is confirmed in passages such as the following:
On the emergent theory we have to reconcile ourselves to much less unity in
the external world and a much less intimate connexion between the various
sciences. At best the external world and the various sciences that deal with it
will form a kind of hierarchy. (p. 78)
21Note that Broad takes a “many-one” perspective on the relata of emergence here, with an unchar-
acteristically flexible understanding of what features may enter into the deduction, as going beyond the
holding of pairwise (or other relatively non-complex) relations between the composing entities, to include
relations between lower-level relata in any other (possibly complex) situations besides that at issue.
33
Emergence has implications for the unity of “the external world” and for the unity of the
sciences “that deal with” the external world. These are clearly claims about metaphysical
emergence; no failures of cognitive connection are ultimately at issue.
Similar remarks apply to other British Emergentists (e.g., Alexander), who, like Broad,
sometimes characterized emergence as involving a failure of predictability. More generally,
as McLaughlin (1992, p. 73) notes, “Emergentists often speak of emergent properties and
laws as unpredictable from what they emerge from. But [. . . ] the Emergentists do not
maintain that something is an emergent because it is unpredictable. Rather, they maintain
that something can be unpredictable because it is an emergent” (p. 73).
4.1.1 Why (failure of) deducibility?
Since Broad’s concern is clearly metaphysical emergence and more specifically Strong
emergence (as involving fundamental laws and associated powers and forces), why does
he characterize emergence in epistemological terms?
I speculate that this reflects a felt need to clarify the notion of fundamentality at issue,
since certain ways of understanding this notion will not make sense of the characteristic
dependence of emergent phenomena. In particular, we cannot here understand “funda-
mental” as “basic”, “independent”, or “axiomatic”. Relatedly, Broad may have wanted
to provide a substantive criterion of fundamentality, for purposes of applying his account.
Insofar as it will plausibly be the case that goings-on governed (in part) by fundamental
“trans-physical” laws will not be deducible from goings-on governed by physical laws, it
would be natural to look to deducibility as a means of clarifying the distinctively de-
pendent sort of fundamentality in Strong emergence. And Broad might reasonably have
thought that the immediate concern with characterizing metaphysical emergence in epis-
temological terms—namely, that creatures as limited as we are might not be cognitively
situated to recognize metaphysical connections that in fact exist—could be overcome by
additionally qualifying the failure of deducibility as being “in-principle”.
That said, the concern remains that even an ideal reasoner might fail to recognize
metaphysical connections that in fact exist, in which case the criterion will produce false
negatives. The procedure might also produce false positives, if certain uncontroversially
physically acceptable phenomena (say, complex dynamical phenomena, of which Broad
wasn’t aware) are in-principle as well as in-practice unpredictable (perhaps because the
sensitivity of such systems to initial conditions would require in-principle unavailable
resources for predictability into the indefinite future). Supposing so, then Broad’s criterion
will inappropriately deem some physically acceptable features of complex phenomena
Strongly emergent, hence physically unacceptable. In-principle failure of deducibility is
thus best seen as a good though not infallible epistemological guide to the metaphysical
features (involving fundamental powers and laws) characterizing Strong emergence.22
4.2 Failure of in-practice deducibility
Failure of deducibility or predictability also enters into some accounts of emergent auton-
omy aiming to characterize physically acceptable emergence (see Newman 1996, Bedau
1997, Rueger 2001); I’ll focus on Bedau’s work as representative in what follows. Bedau’s
22That said, we will shortly consider whether in-principle failure of the broader notion of a priori
entailment might do better along these lines.
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(1997) account applies under conditions where a system S is composed of micro-level en-
tities having associated micro-states, and where a “microdynamic” D governs the time
evolution of S’s microstates:
Macrostate P of S with microdynamic D is weakly emergent i↵ P can be
derived from D and S’s external conditions but only by simulation. (p. 378)
Derivation of a system’s macrostate “by simulation” involves iterating the system’s micro-
dynamic, taking initial and any relevant external conditions as input. A broadly equivalent
conception takes emergent autonomy to involve “explanatory incompressibility”, where
there is no “short-cut” explanation of macro-features of a system with emergent features
(see Bedau 2008). In being derivable by simulation from a micro-physical dynamic, as-
sociated macrostates are understood to be physically acceptable; as Bedau (1997) says,
such systems indicate “that emergence is consistent with reasonable forms of materialism”
(p. 376).
Though Bedau sometimes speaks of such systems as “epistemologically weakly emer-
gent”, he is explicit that the emergence involved is also metaphysical. He signals that
“the modal terms in this definition are metaphysical, not epistemological” (1997, p. 379);
he states his aim of capturing a form of “metaphysical autonomy” (2002, p. 11); he em-
phasizes that “weak emergence is not just in the mind; it is real and objective in nature”
(2008, p. X). Such claims would seem to be in tension with Bedau’s taking it to be char-
acteristic of physically acceptable emergence that “the macro is ontologically and causally
reducible to the micro in principle” (2008, p. 445); but Bedau thinks this implication can
be resisted:
[W]eak emergence exhibits a kind of macro autonomy because of the incom-
pressibility of the micro-causal generative explanation of the macro structure.
Because the explanation is incompressible, it is useless in practice (except in
so far as it serves as the basis for a good simulation of the system). (2008,
p. 449)
But it is unclear how usefulness in practice of explanations appealing to complex micro-
phenomena might be relevant to establishing the ontological and/or causal autonomy of
higher-level features, even granting that there is a metaphysical fact of the matter about
when a feature has or does not have a “compressible” explanation. E↵ectively, such facts,
though perfectly objective, are not of the right sort to ground the requisite ontological and
causal autonomy. There is a parallel here to the failure of mere ontological distinctness
to successfully capture emergent autonomy: what is needed for such autonomy is not
just some or other metaphysical distinction between the higher-level and base features,
but moreover one which plausibly serves as a basis for the causal as well as ontological
autonomy of the former.
There are, however, resources at least potentially available for making sense of gen-
uine autonomy in the cases Bedau aims to characterize, to which Bedau himself sometimes
gestures. We saw previously how Bedau’s (1997) observation that non-linear phenomena
may enter into “simple, general, macro-level patterns” might serve as a basis for estab-
lishing genuine emergent autonomy of a physically acceptable variety: if, more generally,
explanatorily incompressible phenomena enter into di↵erent, higher-level systems of laws,
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this might serve to support an understanding of the associated features as having only a
proper subset of the token powers of their lower-level base features, and hence as genuinely
metaphysically emergent. Relatedly, Bedau (1997) observes: “Interesting macrostates [of
sort at issue in weak emergence] typically average over microstates and so compress mi-
crostate information” (p. 377). If such compression of information involves an elimination
in degrees of freedom (see §3.5), this would provide another route to ontological and
causal autonomy. Alternatively, one might argue that compression of information is in-
dicative of multiple realizability and/or “di↵erence-making” considerations, of the sort
that, as we have seen, plausibly motivate taking the requisite proper subset relation to be
in place (here Bedau’s 2002, p. 25 remarks concerning glider streams and their variable
constituents are evocative). Hence it may be that, while Bedau’s broadly epistemological
account of emergent autonomy does not itself serve to characterize metaphysical emer-
gence, an account based on the relevant metaphysical features of “interesting” cases of
explanatory incompressibility may do so.
4.3 Failure of conceptual entailment
Next, consider Chalmer’s notion of emergence in terms of a failure of a priori or con-
ceptual entailment. Chalmers (1996) characterized (physically unacceptable) emergence
in terms of a failure of broadly logical (conceptual) supervenience; in recent work (see
Chalmers 1999 and Chalmers and Jackson 2001) he has developed the suggestion that
one aspect of meaning is appropriately seen as tracking a priori connections. The notion
of a priori entailment here goes beyond deducibility or any other syntactic notion, rather
being linked to ideal conceivability and associated judgements of what is true in situa-
tions that are fully described along a certain (i.e., fundamental physical) dimension. So,
for example, Chalmers argues that, upon contemplation of a scenario in which exists a
creature functionally and physically identical to ours, an ideal reasoner would positively
conceive that such a creature might not be conscious; Chalmers moreover argues that
such ideal conceivability su ces for establishing the metaphysical possibility in question.
The precise nature of the possibility that is established by so-called “zombie” arguments
is subject to di↵erent broadly dualist interpretations (including substance dualism, robust
emergence, and pan- or proto-psychism); but perhaps in combination with possibilities
established by other ideal conceivings (namely, that there could be no conscious entities
that were not dependently embodied, some way or other, at least in worlds relevantly like
ours) one might so aim to establish the truth of Strong emergence.
It remains controversial whether conceivability, even of the highly idealized and nu-
anced variety, su ces for establishing the truth of various possibilities (see, e.g., Block
and Stalnaker 1999); and the additional concern remains that such an idealized account is
unuseful for or irrelevant to our gaining insight into the structure of natural reality (see,
e.g. Melnyk 2008). Here I want just to call attention to two points. First, Chalmers, like
previous proponents of cognitive conceptions of emergent autonomy, does so in service
of establishing the holding (or failure to hold) of a metaphysical dependence relation.
Second, supposing the strategy works and the appropriate conceivings are in place, the
conception conforms to Strong, and not Weak, emergence. Strong emergence involves
fundamental powers (forces/interactions, laws), and such fundamentality makes room for
and sense of the failures of conceptual entailment present even to idealized conceivers.
By way of contrast, there is no clear reason why an idealized conceiver could not identify
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the connections between Weakly emergent features and their base features, given world
enough and time.
4.4 Mere failures in cognitive connection
Though most epistemological accounts of emergent autononomy are aimed at character-
izing metaphysical emergence (either Weak or Strong), this is not uniformly the case. In
particular, a not-uncommon way of formulating (a version of what is sometimes called)
non-reductive physicalism is as combining both in-principle ontological reduction with
failure of one or other variety of cognitive connection (see, e.g., Smart 1981 and Van
Gulick 2001). On such accounts, the “non-reduction” at issue is understood in purely
epistemological terms, having no metaphysical implications; on the contrary, ontological
reduction is assumed. Metaphysically speaking, such accounts are best understood as
versions of ontologically reductive, not ontologically non-reductive, Physicalism, which
aim to makes sense of the presence and seeming intractability of various explanatory
gaps, and show that these do not pose a threat to such reductionism (see, e.g., Perry
2001). Such accounts may still be seen as addressing the initial motivations for attending
to emergence, of understanding and accounting for the appearances of dependence and
ontological and causal autonomy of higher-level entities, and associated hierarchical rela-
tions between (entities and features treated by) special and more fundamental sciences.
But the account they o↵er will be importantly deflationary, from a metaphysical point of
view, in denying that the appearance of autonomy is genuine (which is not to say that
the appearances themselves are not grounded in objective facts). Given the desirability of
providing a metaphysical ground for the ontological and causal autonomy of higher-level
entities, however, proponents of reductive accounts would do well to consider whether the
epistemological failures in question might, as with Bedau’s understanding of emergence
as involving in-practice failure of deducibility, be at least sometimes understood in terms
compatible with Weak, if not Strong, emergence.
4.5 Results
We have arrived at the following results concerning epistemological accounts of emergent
autonomy:
⇠ Conceptions of emergent autonomy in terms of failure of cognitive connection typi-
cally aim to conform to metaphysical emergence.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of in-principle failure of deducibility aim to conform to Strong
emergence.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of in-practice failure of deducibility (due to, e.g., explanatory
incompressibility) aim to conform toWeak emergence, and may do so if the assump-
tion of in-principle ontological and causal reducibility is dropped and the requisite
ontological and causal autonomy established.
⇠ Conceptions in terms of failure of ideal conceivability aim to conform to Strong
emergence.
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⇠ Accounts of Physicalism characterized in terms of one or other failure of cogni-
tive connection coupled with ontological and causal reducibility fail to characterize
any variety of emergence; these are best seen as versions of ontologically reductive
Physicalism.
5 Concluding remarks
The problem of higher-level causation acts as a crucial constraint on feasible accounts
of synchronically dependent higher-level features; and though the problem is typically
presented in service of motivating one or other stance on the question of physicalism,
consideration of the spectrum of available responses to the problem provides, more gen-
erally, a convenient way of seeing what our options are, so far as making sense of the
metaphysical emergence of higher-level features is concerned.
There are only two responses to the problem making sense of higher-level features
as both appropriately dependent on, and ontologically and causally autonomous from,
lower-level features. Correspondingly, there are only two schemas for metaphysical emer-
gence, which like the responses to the problem turn on the two available ways in which
dependent higher-level features may be causally autonomous vis-a´-vis their base features:
either by having more powers, as per Strong emergence, or by having fewer powers, as
per Weak emergence. Again, the notion of power here is almost entirely metaphysically
neutral, requiring nothing much more than the bare association of (perhaps nomologically
contingent) powers with features. There are no other options for gaining the causal au-
tonomy of dependent higher-level features; hence these two schemas exhaust the available
options for the metaphysical emergence for such entities.
Flexibility remains in filling in the schemas, however, via suitable accounts of emergent
dependence and emergent autonomy. As I have argued, the many seemingly diverse
accounts of these notions, when properly understood, each aim to conform to one or the
other schema. And though my task here was not to assess the success of these aims, I have
pointed out where more work needs to be done if certain accounts of emergent dependence
or autonomy are to satisfy the conditions of the intended schema. Perhaps most crucially,
it remains largely to establish that accounts of Weakly emergent autonomy in terms
of non-linearity, lower-level constraints, and/or explanatory compressibility characterize
higher-level features as having the ontological and causal autonomy requisite for genuine
metaphysical emergence. That proponents have not realized that this work needs to be
done likely reflects, I submit, that the powers-based conditions on (broadly synchronic,
higher-level) metaphysical emergence have not previously been made fully explicit.
Hence it is, I hope, that the two schemas do more than systematize and unify the
seeming diversity of accounts while explaining the variance vis-a´-vis Physicalism. Addi-
tionally, and perhaps more importantly, with the schemas on the table we are in better
position to consider and assess the available ways of filling them in, in ultimate service of
better understanding the potentially diverse—but after all, not all that diverse—structure
of natural reality.
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